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So my understanding following this: * they designed mcas with a g sensor and aoa sensor and a max pitch, to fix a problem in a high speed test. They provide sa
by olliej 7y ago
So my understanding following this:
* they designed mcas with a g sensor and aoa sensor and a max pitch, to fix a problem in a high speed test. They provide safety assessments based on having two sensors, limited pitch changes, and it only triggering in specific rare situations.
* they provided that to the FAA as justification no training was needed, and that there was no need to acknowledge the existence of the system. FAA agreed.
* After FAA approval they discovered that the aircraft didn’t work correctly at low speed either, so they made it activate at low speed as well. Because it activated at low speed a g sensor wasn’t possible (?) so it got removed. Now you only have a single (notoriously unreliable) AoA sensor controlling it. To compensate for poor aero they also needed to increase the amount of pitch needed. So the FAA approved MCAS with a 0.6 degree pitch limit, occurring at high speed, triggered by two independent sensors. Boeing then made the system trigger at low speed, off a single sensor, and increase pitch adjustment to 2.6 degrees.
* Boeing chose not to test what happened if the AoA sensor failed.
* Boeing continued to insist that pilots not be made to retrain, because of contract penalties with southwest. That meant they did not want to mention the existence of the system.
* there safety margins also included an assumption that pilots could respond to a problem in 3s. But when mcas triggered incorrectly they were given speed, stall, and altitude warnings. All of which distracted them from the non-functioning led that indicate activation of a system that Boeing did not tell the pilots existed.
* the standard way to recover from the flight control computer triggering to much pitch was to flip a switch on the stick. Boeing made MCAS override that command, so the standard recovery could not work.
* Boeing continued to claim the plane was airworthy and provided a work around for its hellbent desired to crash, which was to use the manual pitch wheel. Except MCAS was designed in such a way that as part of its crash into the ground logic it put so much stress on the system that it was not physically possible for a pilot to perform the workaround.
In all: more than 300 people are dead because Boeing rushed to make a plane to compete with another company, and then hid information about an overriding control system so that they wouldn’t have to retrain pilots, and that completely changed the parameters of that system after FAA approval such that none of their approved safety claims were remotely true.
All to make some money so executives could get their bonuses.
Every executive who pushed for those changes should be put in jail.
- paulmd 7y agoAnd, Boeing's justification for increasing MCAS capabilities while reducing sensor redundancy needed was that these were changes in degree, not in kind. Nothing about the FAA certification actually depended on the number of sensors required, or the amount of command the system had, the FAA allowed pretty much anything to fly as long as it was only designed to operate when outside of the standard flight envelope. This is the gotcha in the whole liability for executives thing. The FAA is extremely deferential to what manufacturers think is the best practice. Understandably it would be difficult to get every single little change to the flight systems approved - in broad strokes this kind of regulatory inertia is what makes physical changes so difficult in the first place, which indirectly caused this whole problem in the first place. This isn't just a Boeing problem - Boeing was callous and indifferent to public safety, but the FAA let them get away with it. The takeaway from this crisis is that the FAA regulatory system needs significant reform, because it's obvious that it's got some unintended consequences. The correct answer here is that it should have been viable to design the airplane in an inherently aerodynamically safe fashion while the band-aid patch should have received a huge degree of scrutiny, but that's essentially the opposite of the system that the FAA has created.
- thatswrong0 7y agoThe FAA situation is a difficult one to resolve - having full understanding of these systems requires a great deal of expertise, and that kind of expertise is found most easily at, obviously, the companies under regulation. More funding / regulators would certainly help, but I'm not sure if that would be sufficient. > but the FAA let them get away with it Well, the FAA thought the MCAS had a command limit of 0.6 degrees when it actually became 2.5 degrees after the changes mentioned in this article. From the other Seattle Times article about this: > If the final safety analysis document was updated in parts, it certainly still contained the 0.6 limit in some places and the update was not widely communicated within the FAA technical evaluation team. > “None of the engineers were aware of a higher limit,” said a second current FAA engineer. To me it's less of a they "let them get away with it" and more of a "they had limited resources and things slipped through". Unfortunately this difference doesn't really matter when 300+ people are dead