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The thing that still bothers me about the 737 MAX information I've seen, in particular from the NYT article that was discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.co

The thing that still bothers me about the 737 MAX information I've seen, in particular from the NYT article that was discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20070509 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20070509 is that I'm not convinced anyone at Boeing understood the flight characteristics of the aircraft, even after the 1st crash. When you have a very complex system, which has been incrementally modified over a 50 year period, it is going to be really difficult to understand all the interactions. The NYT article describes a Jan 2016 parameter change on the MCAS to make it faster and more powerful. I am convinced that the MCAS will be studied and understood, and pilots can be trained to respond appropriately. I'm not convinced that there is a process in place where the consequences of changes to the aircraft are known and tested in advance. Ultimately, if the pilot is willing to fly, I'm willing to fly, but based on what I've seen, I don't think there was an adequate change control process in place, and as long as that is true issues will continue to be "discovered" in flight. Training is a solution to known problems, not unknown problems.

salawat 7y ago
I have trouble believing that Boeing didn't know exactly how that plane flew. Back in the 60's, Boeing was notorious amongst test pilots for knowing exactly how a plane would behave, when it would misbehave, and how[1]. That's back then. The state of the art in CFD has only made the process easier. There is absolutely no room for them to have not known the physical ramifications of that change. Where the story gets sketchy is where Boeing didn't update the FAA on the later change to the system, and every attempt being made to ensure that they didn't design anything such that the FAA would deem simulator training necessary as evidenced by whistleblower testimony (See the Australian 60 minutes expose[2]). [1] The D. P. Davies Interview, Royal Aeronautics Society, https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-testing-the-comets-boeing-707-britannia-brabazon/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-the-boeing-747-the-trident-vc10-one-eleven-the-boeing-727/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... [2]https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc

salawat 7y ago

I have trouble believing that Boeing didn't know exactly how that plane flew. Back in the 60's, Boeing was notorious amongst test pilots for knowing exactly how a plane would behave, when it would misbehave, and how[1]. That's back then. The state of the art in CFD has only made the process easier. There is absolutely no room for them to have not known the physical ramifications of that change. Where the story gets sketchy is where Boeing didn't update the FAA on the later change to the system, and every attempt being made to ensure that they didn't design anything such that the FAA would deem simulator training necessary as evidenced by whistleblower testimony (See the Australian 60 minutes expose[2]). [1] The D. P. Davies Interview, Royal Aeronautics Society, https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-testing-the-comets-boeing-707-britannia-brabazon/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-the-boeing-747-the-trident-vc10-one-eleven-the-boeing-727/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... [2]https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc