It would be almost misleading not to mention that the implied freedom of political communication is very limited and doesn't have even close to the depth and br

It would be almost misleading not to mention that the implied freedom of political communication is very limited and doesn't have even close to the depth and breadth of jurisprudence that 1st Amendment arguments have in the US. The argument at its most extreme that various unauthorised disclosure criminal provisions could be invalid for IFPC reasons is outlined here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0067205X1804600301 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0067205X1804600... (Or as a blog post if you don't have access: https://auspublaw.org/2016/04/public-sector-whistleblowing/ https://auspublaw.org/2016/04/public-sector-whistleblowing/) But it's shaky at best. Who is to say that the nature of Special Intelligence Operations and the restrictions on their existence don't justify having no public interest exceptions to disclosures about them, for example? The paper makes this point accidentally (via a Wotton v Queensland analogy, at 362). I just don't see the current applications as being strong enough, especially where the legitimate object of the legislation is national security.