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It's a PCB manufacturer. They aren't buying computers from china. The company that did design the electronics (GE) decided to have this little outfit manufact
by ajross 7y ago
It's a PCB manufacturer.
They aren't buying computers from china. The company that did design the electronics (GE) decided to have this little outfit manufacture the PCBs for them (I mean, we're talking a production run in the low thousands so far -- this is NOT a big project). And the little outfit got bought by a bigger PCB company in China a few years back.
The risk to the supply chain is zero -- anyone can make printed circuit boards. The intelligence risk is limited to the ability to see how chips are wired together, with some ability to guess what ICs are in use by clues in the pinouts.
- DoofusOfDeath 7y agoCouldn't a good state-run sabotage take advantage of assumptions about how much scrutiny/inspection is needed for a given component? For example, suppose there was some little-known chemistry that would make a PCB likely to fail $X years after manufacture. Or bonus points if it had out-gassing that made other, innocent parts have high failure rates?
- cheerlessbog 7y agoAny malicious intervention would as you say have to be very subtle to pass system tests. Given they cannot know whether and when the planes would ever be used against them, it would be playing the long game at best.
- 8note 7y agoI'm imaging failure cases under high Gs when the thing tries to do some high speed data transfer? let the traces move enough to introduce cross talk if its vibrated and accelerated in just the right way. There is a short term gain, even if they never get used against china: the US and it's allies have to spend more in testing to account for the Chinese built PCBs.
- monocasa 7y agoGiven that it's a fighterjet board, it's probably just a glorified FPGA breakout board.
- monocasa 7y agoFor real though. They stick anything and everything interesting in FPGAs for defense aerospace. Check out this missile guidance computer. https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3649 https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3649 Pretty much just a PowerPC and some RAM glued to a giant FPGA with a lot of off board inputs. These days they'd use something like a Zynq that has the hard processor core on the FPGA die, making it look even more like an FPGA breakout board.
- ajross 7y agoThat's for new-manufactured boards. My guess is this whole run completed years ago. And surely new boards will be farmed out to some other Mom & Pop PCB shop. These companies are everywhere, electronics assembly is not meaningfully "high tech" any more.
- robin_reala 7y agoI guess Bloomberg might have something to say about PCBs not being a security risk. Did they ever back up that story in any way?
- dmoy 7y agoIf they were made after the Chinese purchase, maybe. There's no indication in the article that they were though.
- analognoise 7y agoExcept that in the US defense industry, anyone working for a foreign company is to be regarded as a foreign national (even if they have a subsidiary that is in the US). While a part of me agrees, I don't want the Chinese to have access to even non-critical things. What if they insert some kind of small component that can be embedded in a PCB stackup that siphons data from a bus, or introduce a high Q resonator that creates an easily discoverable signature when hit with a certain frequency, or something else (like The Thing - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device)? x-ray inspection at the bare-board level would check for both of those things (of course), but usually x-ray inspection is done by the assembler after boards are populated - not before - and I've never heard of it being one on a bare-board as an inspection step post receipt. So something like this actually could be missed. You wouldn't even need to do it to every board, you could do it to some fraction of them, and have (essentially) a secret frequency vulnerability lying in wait. Basically it would invalidate your stealth/LO (obviously this is dependent on shielding and a lot of other things, but you get the idea).
- heavenlyblue 7y agoPretty sure it’s quite easy to test for any resonators in a radio test chamber.
- metaphor 7y agoAny test is only effective if it's actually performed during acceptance, and there's no requirement provision for such test in any acceptance qualification that I'm aware of. In either case, it's kind of a shitty test given defense applications aren't constrained to the same EMC regulations as the rest of the commercial world.
- diydsp 7y ago> The intelligence risk is limited to the ability to see how chips are wired together, with some ability to guess what ICs are in use by clues in the pinouts. No, they could insert fake chips during the assembly. Chips that do almost anything, from interfere with operation to logging information, to transmitting data, to exploding in place.
- chrisseaton 7y agoI don't know anything about intercepting electronics, but I would not bet my life (which is what you're doing) that a good signals intelligence agency cannot somehow compromise a PCB.
- jackfoxy 7y agoNever underestimate motivated spooks with unlimited budget and access to the best and brightest.
- vidarh 7y agoI agree. I mean if we're guessing at possible dangers, it seems like there are several possible angles that might be tempting to try: - It's meant to be a stealthy plane, how about tweaking the board to cause a nice and noisy signal leak in certain circumstances? - find a way of causing the board to fail under suitable circumstances. - Probably less plausible, if they can figure out what data is passing through the board, then there is potential to engineer side-channels in the hope that they can achieve another compromise that can leverage it. Maybe they never get the chance to take advantage, maybe they do. Or if e.g. they can find an input that an adversary can potentially influence by how they engage with the plane, use that to trigger failure as above. I'm assuming they're properly inspected and tested on receipt, but wires on circuit boards can interfere with each other in messy ways if you exceed tolerances even a little bit. I recall an amusing case some years back where someone used genetic algorithms to lay out features on an FPGA and got a very good solution that was totally un-reproducible: it turned out their GA had optimized to take advantage of quirks of that one specific FPGA that didn't work on other FPGA's of the same model, by combining things in ways it hadn't been designed for. It seems it's very much possible to design chips that superficially looks like it should act one way but where it acts differently in certainly circumstances. Doing so in a way that's exploitable without being caught out is probably much harder, but I share your skepticism.
- delfinom 7y agoThat's not how PCBs work at all. Dear god. Such mission critical to EMI designs would be submitted to full spectrum EMI tests once assembled (hitting it with noise of all kinds of frequencies AND testing it for leaks of all kinds). Causing a bare board to fail? lol, perhaps if you have an atomic disintegrator. Assembled boards with actual components? Now you have something you can actually fail but this PCB house does not do said assembly nor have access to that. Figure out what data? Completely impossible. These are just copper traces. They don't get told "Mr Copper trace, you are going to do i2c and send XYZ data! and you are going to be a pci express and send ABC!" at the fab. Jeez. Now a real cause for concern, if say a state actor had access to the completed assembly going into the planes, they could identify a place to embed a backdoor. The state actor controlled PCB house could then embed the backdoor into the PCB itself. But at that point you have 2 different security breaches and the PCB guy is probably lesser of your concerns. The dumber thing would be to alter the current carrying capacity of power traces which tend to be obvious staring at a board. But it would just identical to trolling by causing boards to fail and eventually get it investigated and your supplier contract revoked.
- quickben 7y ago>The risk to the supply chain is zero Hypothetically, what would happen to a pcb board , 33x33cm in size, with the ground lines running around the edge of that board, when hit with a high power 900 MHz broadcast?
- ryanmarsh 7y ago“Hypothetically speaking”. Heh. Good one. On that note I don’t understand the willful cognitive dissonance around Chinese espionage. They’re a powerful state aggressively looking out for their own self interests just like all the others.
- mysterydip 7y agoAircraft go through many tests, including various electromagnetic interference tests. They should know exactly how it responds in such a scenario. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIL-STD-461 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIL-STD-461
- quickben 7y agoOf course, I was just illustrating with an elementary electromagnetism example that the risk isn't zero.
- mysterydip 7y agoThat's fair. There's always supply chain risk in more nefarious ways as well (rootkit/trojan in bios, etc)
- pps43 7y agoThat high power 900 MHz broadcast will travel half an inch, then get absorbed by the metal housing. Military electronics are shielded, both to protect them from EMP and to avoid detection by passive radar.
- jorblumesea 7y agoWhat? This is exactly where an intelligence agency would step in and add an extra little chip onto the board. There's tons of precedence for this. Unless the government inspected every board individually, there's no way to guarantee supply chain. At least from a national defense perspective, everything that comes out of China is a possible risk. To flip the debate around, if the US manufactured PCBs for China, don't you think we would do the same thing?
- MrMorden 7y agoAn extra chip on a bare board would stand out quite a bit.
- mrob 7y agoAn extra chip embedded between the layers would only be detectable by X-ray inspection.
- jorblumesea 7y agoDepends on where the chip is and what it did. It's possible to hide chips between layers, hide chips under chips, replace an existing chip with something that looks almost just like it with additional functions. It's really not hard to imagine some smart people being told to make it work.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- alexnewman 7y agoI thought this was hard for complicated VIAs
- lstodd 7y agoIt's no problem - just buy a bigger PCB machine produced in China.
- one2know 7y agoFrom the accusations of China compromising motherboards a few months ago, the exploits are: Incorporating transmitters that look like surface mount components. Imagine putting a small transmitter into the design on a signal trace where a resistor or capacitor normally would go and then setting up a receiver just outside a base to catch the signal. It could record all kinds of things and transmit it a short distance, weapons loadout, fuel amount, when the aircraft leaves the base, etc. The second is that some components can be squished between PCB layers such that the only way to detect them is through xray inspection. And for you security deniers that say nothing like this ever happens, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...
- gmueckl 7y agoFor transmitters, sure, that might work with a lot of caveats attached. For example, you need to repurpose wires on the PCB to act as antennas and then hope that the shielding around the elctronics will be transparent enough to pick anything up. But getting the information to be transmitted is a lot harder. I don't know what kind of component this is, but I suspect that not a lot of PCBs have direct access to that kind of high level information (assuming that there is a kind of system bus that even passes such data around...).
- one2know 7y agoI think in this type of business it is take what you can get as far as technology. A fuel pump PCB could be bugged one way, while a core flight control PCB could be bugged another. The bugs could also carry their own sensors. A simple pressure sensor could report altitude, and an accelerometer/compass could report motion. Those could be placed on the output stage of one of dozens of antenna or radar hardware. Even modulating a light bulb or LED slightly can transmit data that can be seen miles away.
- johnwalkr 7y agoIt is a big project in terms of people, and it's not impossible that bill of materials was referenced at some point. Even if not, the netlist which must surely have been provided for testing purposes must provide many clues (unrealistic example: AVR8_RX). Even if "only" PCB manufacture was done, there's a lot of information, on par (better, in fact!) with xraying the assembled product.
- dboreham 7y agoLast time I worked on PCB design and manufacture liaison this isn't the way it's done. You send artwork (in electronic form) to the sub. They perform a connectivity test on the finished boards but the net list they test against was derived by their CAM system from the artwork data. We never released our CAD netlist data to them and honestly I don't think they'd know what to do with it if we had. Ymmv since this is an old data point.
- Taniwha 7y agoYes, the data formats for PCB design data are so old they are commands for a now nonexistent photoplotter, a list of circles and rectangles
- deepnotderp 7y agoI don't think anyone who knows what they're talking about is worrying about supply chain risk, what they're worried about is backdoor risk. Controlling pcb manufacturing is a good way to be able to put all sorts of surveillance chips, backdoor chips, etc. on the pcbs.
- baybal2 7y ago> The risk to the supply chain is zero -- anyone can make printed circuit boards. The intelligence risk is limited to the ability to see how chips are wired together, with some ability to guess what ICs are in use by clues in the pinouts. Raytheon once ran into a "small" problem with it. They actually did whole PCBA in China for AIM 9L. There is a blogger guy who actually found a whole image processing board with top tier FPGAs that somehow got to an electronics scrap trader around here few years ago.
- brokenmachine 7y agoI would like to read that if you can find the link.
- baybal2 7y agohttps://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3649 https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3649 the link above is about that particular case, but the hearsays of American defence hardware like ICBM gyros popping up around China in scrap piles predates that by few years
- brokenmachine 7y agoThanks for that, very interesting.
- Tsubasachan 7y agoIts just hilarious example of how China is part of the global economy despite Trumps escalating tweets (trade deficit continues to climb by the way if anyone's interested). I am sure China knows everything about the F-35 its not a secret weapon.