3 ms·

I don't think it's reasonable to make the assumptions you make in your three-part calculus, though I do acknowledge that it's a thoughtful way of considering th

by jMyles 7y ago

I don't think it's reasonable to make the assumptions you make in your three-part calculus, though I do acknowledge that it's a thoughtful way of considering the matter. But what if an intact brain is an important part of navigating the first 10 minutes or so of the experience of being dead? I prefer not to have my brain mushed at all, and let it very slowly decompose. Certainly the first hours of being dead, while it's still possible that electrical or chemical activity in the brain is ongoing, I prefer for it to be intact and at peace.

darkpuma 7y ago
My calculus is predicated on the assumption of a materialistic mind and no afterlife (e.g. there is no experience of being dead, only experiences of dying.) If those assumptions are wrong, then I think there is no firm ground on which to speculate at all (maybe Valhalla is the true afterlife and a gory death in battle is the most form of death the dead find most satisfactory. I don't believe that, but I disbelieve it only as hard as I disbelieve the Christian afterlife.) In my model of the world, perhaps a brain slowly ramping down is a pleasant experience. That's totally conceivable to me. However the brain being instantly disassembled faster than it can have experiences would be the absence of experience, be it a pleasant or unpleasant.
- jMyles 7y ago
  > My calculus is predicated on the assumption of a materialistic mind and no afterlife But even then, we can't know the difference in experience for brain matter sprayed all over the room vs contained in one place. A materialistic model asks us to question what happens when the material in question is rapidly separated and damaged, no? Are individual pieces of cortex capable of experiencing distress for the minutes or hours in question? We have no idea.

3 ms·

I don't think it's reasonable to make the assumptions you make in your three-part calculus, though I do acknowledge that it's a thoughtful way of considering th

by jMyles 7y ago

darkpuma 7y ago
My calculus is predicated on the assumption of a materialistic mind and no afterlife (e.g. there is no experience of being dead, only experiences of dying.) If those assumptions are wrong, then I think there is no firm ground on which to speculate at all (maybe Valhalla is the true afterlife and a gory death in battle is the most form of death the dead find most satisfactory. I don't believe that, but I disbelieve it only as hard as I disbelieve the Christian afterlife.) In my model of the world, perhaps a brain slowly ramping down is a pleasant experience. That's totally conceivable to me. However the brain being instantly disassembled faster than it can have experiences would be the absence of experience, be it a pleasant or unpleasant.
- jMyles 7y ago
  > My calculus is predicated on the assumption of a materialistic mind and no afterlife But even then, we can't know the difference in experience for brain matter sprayed all over the room vs contained in one place. A materialistic model asks us to question what happens when the material in question is rapidly separated and damaged, no? Are individual pieces of cortex capable of experiencing distress for the minutes or hours in question? We have no idea.