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Can elaborate more on the practical benefits of encrypted memory? Presumably this is mainly good for multi-user systems? On the average single-user system it se
by _red 7y ago
Can elaborate more on the practical benefits of encrypted memory? Presumably this is mainly good for multi-user systems? On the average single-user system it seems that if you can already read memory there are 1000 other possible exploits that are cheaper / easier to perform (ie. keylog, screen capture, etc).
- gruez 7y agoAFAIK the only thing it protects you from is generic malware that scans process memory for passwords. It’s trivial to bypass though: all you need to do is patch the code as it’s running to dump all the plaintext entries for you. > there are 1000 other possible exploits that are cheaper / easier to perform (ie. keylog, screen capture, etc). Keepass has mitigations for those as well.
- masklinn 7y ago> AFAIK the only thing it protects you from is generic malware that scans process memory for passwords. Apparently it doesn't even do that: https://www.securityevaluators.com/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/ https://www.securityevaluators.com/casestudies/password-mana... (section Keepass) Possibly because keepass uses the wrong flag? https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.cryptography.memoryprotectionscope https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.... seems to say that the memory segment can be decrypted by either: * all processes running on the box * all processes owned by the same user * only this process Alternatively, might be because C# and the memory protection primitives don't prevent the GC from copying its data out of the protected area? IDK edit: ah, or they might be using ProtectedData rather than ProtectedMemory, that only has the "same machine" and "same user" levels of protection: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.cryptography.dataprotectionscope https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security....
- SamuelAdams 7y agoCrash reports often include memory dumps. Firefox automatically reports these to Mozilla - there's plenty of other software that auto-reports crash data as well. If that crash data includes in-memory credentials, that could lead to your master password being compromised.
- 292355744930110 7y agoKeepassXC disables core dumps[0]. [0] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/2718#issuecomment-466160954 https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/2718#issu...
- blattimwind 7y ago> Crash reports often include memory dumps. Firefox automatically reports these to Mozilla Of the process in question, not the entire system. A Firefox crash dump can potentially still include credentials and private keys, of course.