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> I don't think it's helpful to treat these as isolated one-offs caused by a bogus configuration. That’s why I said the config change is “just the trigger”. Ro
by klodolph 7y ago
> I don't think it's helpful to treat these as isolated one-offs caused by a bogus configuration.
That’s why I said the config change is “just the trigger”. Root cause analysis will generally result in multiple causes for any problem.
> Perhaps what is required is a completely different attitude to config changes, which treats them as testable, applies them incrementally and allows simple rollback.
Google already has that, you can see it in the postmortems for other outages. It’s called canary.
> Code is stored in version control and extensively tested before deployment. Are config changes treated the same way? It certainly doesn't seem like it. Config changes should not be hard to test, hard to diagnose, and hard to rollback.
Unfortunately, in the real world config changes are hard to test. Not always, but often. Working on large deployments has taught me that even with config changes checked in to source control, with automatic canary and gradual rollouts, you will still have outages.
Code doesn’t have 100% test coverage either. Chasing after 100% coverage is a pipe dream.
- grey-area 7y agoUnfortunately, in the real world config changes are hard to test. I'm not trying to suggest that I know what the answer is and it's simple, just that config does need more work, it now seems to be the point of failure for all these big networks (rather than hardware or code changes). These big providers seem to have almost entirely tackled hardware changes and software changes as causes of outages, and configs have been exposed as the new point of failure. That will require rethinking how configs are managed and how they are applied. I'm not talking about 100% test coverage, but failure recovery. The article does suggest that config was the root cause: In essence, the root cause of Sunday’s disruption was a configuration change that was intended for a small number of servers in a single region What I'm suggesting is that what google (and Amazon) has for configs is not good enough, that the root cause of this outage was in fact a config change (like all the others), and that what is required is a rethink of configs which recognises that they need an entirely separate control plane, should never be global, should not be hard to test etc. Clearly here, since the bad config was able to stop them actually fixing the problem, they need to rethink how their configs are applied somehow. As this keeps happening with different config changes I'd suggest this is not a one-off isolated problem but a symptom of a broader failure to tackle the fragile nature of current config systems.
- klodolph 7y agoDisclosure: I work in DevOps/SRE and I am honestly a bit put off by what you are saying. I think I'm actually a little bit angry at your comment. It’s easy to say things like “should never be global” and “should not be hard to test”. These are goals, and meanwhile the business must go on, you also have other goals, and you cannot spend your entire budget preventing network outages and testing configs. The things you are suggesting—separate control plane, non-global configs, making them easy to test—you can find these suggestions in any book on operations. So forgive me if your comment makes me a bit angry.
- grey-area 7y agoSorry about that. It wasn't intended to be a glib response, nor to minimise the work done in these areas, and I'm aware these goals are easy to state and incredibly hard to achieve. I've read the Google SRE book so probably the ideas just came from there. From the outside, it does seem like config is in need of more work, because now that other challenges have been met, it is the one area that consistently causes outages now.
- klodolph 7y agoI will say that every time I’ve seen an outage triggered by a config push, there have been several other bugs involved at the same time. Software / code is still a problem, I wouldn't consider it solved, it’s just that the bugs will turn into outages during config changes.
- peterwwillis 7y agoDon't think of it as "config". Think of it as input, to a global network of inter-dependent distributed decentralized programs, which control other programs, that then change inputs, that change the programs again, and which are never "off", but always just shifting where bits are. Imagine a cloud-based web application. You've got your app code, and let's say an embedded HTTP server. The code needs to run somewhere, on Lambda, or ECS, or EC2. You need an S3 bucket, a load balancer, an internet gateway, security groups, Route53 records, roles, policies, VPCs. Each of those has a config, and when any is applied it affects all the other components, because they're part of a chain of dependencies. Now make the changes in multiple regions. Tests add up quickly, and that's just in ways that were obvious. Now add tests for outages of each component, timeouts, bad data, resource starvation, etc. Just a simple web service can mean tens of thousands of tests. We imagine that because the things we're manipulating are digital, they must behave predictably. But they don't. Look at all the databases tested by Jepsen[1]. People who are intelligent and are paid lots of money still regularly create distributed systems with huge flaws that affect production systems. Creating a complex, predictable system is h a r d (and for Turing-complete systems, actually impossible - see the halting problem). [1] https://jepsen.io/ https://jepsen.io/