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> That's not moving the liability the buyer, that's just part of the insurance cost. It doesn't cause the buyer to be less careless or care more about security.
by arcticbull 7y ago
> That's not moving the liability the buyer, that's just part of the insurance cost. It doesn't cause the buyer to be less careless or care more about security. And there is still currently no plausible cash-equivalent over the internet.
Right, which drives up transaction volume which in turn means the payment network and the seller get more volume and more money. The risk is accounted for in interchange.
> Insurance companies make more money when everybody has to buy insurance. How is that an argument for forcing everybody to buy insurance? "Middlemen make more profit" is an argument against.
The bigger your risk pool the lower your cost. That's how insurance works. The more people you can socialize big losses over, the less you have to charge each person. Your margin on top is a function of your business goals. It's not strictly true that more people equals more money, you can always pass on the costs. Depends on where you make your money. A 501(c)(3) that offers insurance for instance would just charge less.
> You're using peak cash back and average interchange fees. The cards with 2% cash back aren't the cards with 3% interchange fees. And you're not accounting for the merchant losses from the chargeback itself which causes them to have to charge higher prices.
3% for card present is actually really high, I was using a blended average of the ~2.5ish% charged for card-present, 3ish% charged for online and 3.5ish% charged for card-not-present transactions at the point of sale to small and medium sized businesses. You can expect this to be 1% lower for merchants of substantial scale.
I'm not sure what you're suggesting is true. If we look at markets that cap interchange fees, they charge 0.3% [1]. Therefore, I think it's safe to assume that 0.3% is typical to cover the cost of loan origination and fraud. The rest is returned to consumers via rewards programs, plus a little cream due to lack of regulation. Further Visa interchange on that 2% cash back card is no more than 2.4% meaning I'm not out of the ballpark with my 2% rewards + 0.3% loan origination costs + 0.1% cream/chargebacks/misc insurances/etc. [2]
> Meanwhile a legitimate $2000 chargeback is atypically large.
Hey, you asked for mine, I gave it to you.
> Those numbers go even further south for people with bad credit who can't get a cash back card and then have to shop at low income merchants who suffer a high customer fraud rate, meanwhile they won't be making a large legitimate chargeback because they can't afford purchases that large to begin with.
Again, see [2].
> Marketing gimmicks that purposely sound valuable but aren't worth very much in practice.
In what way is my getting a one-month-free loan a gimmick? It's the foundation on which I structure my personal finances, secure in the knowledge if someone defrauds me I don't have to pay until it's resolved. I've also taken advantage of the loss protection.
> You're asking for data so I'm asking to run the experiment. How else do you get better data?
And your claim that the interests are aligned ignores the cost of the insurance. If you can get a discount for waiving your right to a chargeback for a merchant you trust, it's basically free money, and your interests are both aligned in not paying for insurance you don't need. If the fee is then high to have a right to do a chargeback against the shady merchant you don't trust, maybe there is good reason for that.
If you start letting people waive the cost of insurance adverse selection kicks in so now only the people who plan to abuse the system pay for the insurance making it prohibitively expensive. This is why you don't allow people whose houses are on fire to buy fire insurance. Or why until recently you couldn't get health care in the individual market that covered pre-existing conditions. Why on earth wouldn't you not get cover until you needed it then buy it? Because that's not how insurance works.
> The sample is confounded because many merchants don't offer a cash discount but many credit cards still offer cash back, and cash is slower, so many customers prefer credit cards for reasons outside of the ability to refuse charges later.
Debit cards?
> But even then, many people nonetheless pay cash, especially when the discount actually exists. If the value of being able to do a chargeback was so great, why would anybody ever do that? More importantly, why shouldn't they be able to, including over the internet?
I'm saying the value you're suggesting doesn't exist. If it did, it'd be an option. And that that's not how insurance works.
I don't know, you keep making un-founded assertions as though they were fact then demanding an opportunity to prove them. I don't understand why you're suggesting that this is some big money-making scam when it's far more profitable for these companies to increase transaction volume than to skim 'chargeback insurances' which just aren't that big a portion of interchange.
Let me ask this: how much do you think chargebacks actually cost and do you have data to back this up.
[1] https://www.adyen.com/blog/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-eu-interchange-cap https://www.adyen.com/blog/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-eu...
[2] https://squareup.com/guides/credit-card-processing-fees-and-rates https://squareup.com/guides/credit-card-processing-fees-and-...
- AnthonyMouse 7y ago> Right, which drives up transaction volume which in turn means the payment network and the seller get more volume and more money. It only drives up transaction volume for high risk transactions, which is bad because those are the ones that increase the amount of fraud. > The risk is accounted for in interchange. The risk is magnified from fraud taking advantage of the insurance. You have to pay more because the insurance is a deep pocket to steal from with weak ability to protect itself because the actual parties are no longer vested in preventing it. Or the cost of the "insurance payout" is paid by the merchant who knows that they're innocent but the payment processor has no way to know that. > The bigger your risk pool the lower your cost. That's how insurance works. The more people you can socialize big losses over, the less you have to charge each person. That's not how insurance works at all. You buy insurance because you and some other people each have a 0.1% risk of losing $100,000 and you would each rather pay $100 with 100% probability than $100,000 with 0.1% probability. For this to work it makes no difference whether there are a million other people or a billion. It only matters if you get down to something like 1000 people and even then your expected value is still the same, but there is a greater chance that your premium ends up as either $200 or $0 instead of $100. But we're not talking about population numbers that low here anyway. And the socialized losses are the issue, because that's a moral hazard. Once you're insured you take bad risks and rely on the insurance to eat it, which raises costs for everybody. When you have to insure a $100K+ loss you can't afford to suffer, you're willing to eat that overhead. But to insure a $100 loss? It makes no sense. You're going to make enough $100 purchases yourself that you can "self insure" cheaper than an insurance company with bureaucratic overhead and moral hazard can do it for you. It costs less to lose your modest purchase price a small percentage of the time than to pay a higher than that percentage for the insurance. And the amount you lose buying the insurance is inherently more than the amount you lose of your own on average unless the insurance company is losing money. > Your margin on top is a function of your business goals. It's not strictly true that more people equals more money, you can always pass on the costs. Depends on where you make your money. A 501(c)(3) that offers insurance for instance would just charge less. If your net margins per transaction as an insurer are a given percentage, you make more money by processing more transactions unless that percentage is zero or negative. A non-profit may purposely have zero margins, but then in what sense is it "in their interest" to have greater volume? (And how many non-profit major banks are you aware of?) > 3% for card present is actually really high, I was using a blended average of the ~2.5ish% charged for card-present, 3ish% charged for online and 3.5ish% charged for card-not-present transactions at the point of sale to small and medium sized businesses. You can expect this to be 1% lower for merchants of substantial scale. You're implying that "merchants of substantial scale" are paying an average of around 2%, or around 1.5% for card present transactions, for cards paying 2% cash back. That seems a bit fishy, doesn't it? Square is using "let us mush all this together and average it out for you" pricing, but that only really works if they reject merchants with high chargeback rates etc., and still requires them to raise their rates if cards that give higher rewards by charging higher fees become more popular. Meanwhile most other payment processors are going to impose chargeback fees on top of that, which is what we're really trying to avoid here -- plus the major cost that isn't in any of these numbers which is the cost of lost merchandise and labor when there is a fraudulent chargeback for goods and services already rendered. > Again, see [2]. Right, so the merchant is paying 2.9% to Square, but the poor customer has a 0% cash back card because with their credit history it's all they can do to get a credit card offer at all. Then too many of the merchant's other low income customers commit fraud and they get kicked off of Square and have to suffer the high end of "between 2.87 percent and 4.35 percent" from whichever of Square's competitors will take them. This customer might be quite pleased to precommit to not doing a chargeback with a trustworthy merchant in exchange for a ~4% discount.