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Not necessarily. You could provide people with a 4 digit code they can use alongside their id to verify that their vote was counted as they intended, but also g

by hjk05 7y ago

Not necessarily. You could provide people with a 4 digit code they can use alongside their id to verify that their vote was counted as they intended, but also give them access to a tool that allows them to receive a code that “proves” their vote was counted for any arbitrary party. That way you can verify you own code because you know the real reference code, but anyone else can’t rely on your vote truthfully being anything beyond them trusting you, which is already the case for the current system.

Nursie 7y ago
Not sure I'm seeing the 'proof' there. By what mechanism do these two codes prove anything much? If the 'real' code shows one thing and the 'fake' codes another what assurance do you have that the counting was done with your 'real' code and the voting machine didn't put another one in there?
- aeternus 7y ago
  Here's one way to do it that requires basically zero trust in the software: 1) When voters enter the booth, they throw a large number of multi-sided dice. 2) The resultant throw is scanned via computer-vision. Voter verifies it is correct, and it becomes the voter's ID. Voter votes normally and the vote is recorded alongside that generated "ID". 3) The voter receives a print-out that contains their (ID, vote), however it is randomly shuffled in among other real (ID, vote) pairs. The print-out is guaranteed to have at least one vote for each candidate. 4) The entire list of (ID, vote) pairs can be published nationally. Everyone can verify that the right number of votes were counted, and that their vote was accurately counted since they can find both their ID and vote in the national list. They can show their receipt to others but cannot prove which one of the many IDs on the receipt was actually theirs.
  - Nursie 7y ago
    OK, OK, thankyou! I can see that working, particularly part 3 there being key. Seriously I've been asking for years and this is the first time anyone's actually spelled out a scheme that allows the person to go back and prove the vote to themselves and have genuine plausible deniability to others who may seek to coerce them. Thanks :)

by hjk05 7y ago

Nursie 7y ago

Not sure I'm seeing the 'proof' there. By what mechanism do these two codes prove anything much? If the 'real' code shows one thing and the 'fake' codes another what assurance do you have that the counting was done with your 'real' code and the voting machine didn't put another one in there?

aeternus 7y ago
Here's one way to do it that requires basically zero trust in the software: 1) When voters enter the booth, they throw a large number of multi-sided dice. 2) The resultant throw is scanned via computer-vision. Voter verifies it is correct, and it becomes the voter's ID. Voter votes normally and the vote is recorded alongside that generated "ID". 3) The voter receives a print-out that contains their (ID, vote), however it is randomly shuffled in among other real (ID, vote) pairs. The print-out is guaranteed to have at least one vote for each candidate. 4) The entire list of (ID, vote) pairs can be published nationally. Everyone can verify that the right number of votes were counted, and that their vote was accurately counted since they can find both their ID and vote in the national list. They can show their receipt to others but cannot prove which one of the many IDs on the receipt was actually theirs.
- Nursie 7y ago
  OK, OK, thankyou! I can see that working, particularly part 3 there being key. Seriously I've been asking for years and this is the first time anyone's actually spelled out a scheme that allows the person to go back and prove the vote to themselves and have genuine plausible deniability to others who may seek to coerce them. Thanks :)