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If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am cur

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing something? These are trained humans why does the computer totally ignore there efforts?

jacobush 7y ago
You make it sound like the plane has some kind of agency. Though a plane is very complicated, the treacherous MCAS system is actually very simple.
- tachi_coma 7y ago
  I'm looking at the graph and imagining the MCAS with a bubbling, gleeful voice, not unlike that of a Tachikoma discovering something new. [0] Oh boy! A game! I love games! Like a dog with a tennis ball in its mouth, thinking the game is tug-o-war and not fetch. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNY53tZ2geg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNY53tZ2geg During the final nose down, I can hear the Tachikoma triumphantly cheer, "I WIN!"
781 7y ago
If it only were that simple. Airbus in particular has a lot of systems which PREVENT the human from doing things. One plane actually crashed because the prevention system disabled itself and the pilots believed it was still there to protect them from bad actions on their part: > caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall, from which it did not recover https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
- sago 7y ago
  It seems a bit rough that you're getting downvotes. [Edit: The parent was grey when I wrote this]. AF447 seems like a pretty important case study for figuring out where to put the balance of trust. Along with the very final stage of Aeroflot 593 (after the child had left the seat), also mentioned. There's a few more: Colgan Air 3407, AirAsia 8501, Korean 501, etc, where flight crew ignored or overrode systems. Which is not to deny that in the majority of cases the flight crew are the best judge of what is needed, just that one surely has to look critically and honestly at counter examples. There is of course also Germanwings 9525, though as the GP implies, systems protecting against malicious piloting will probably be counter-productive.
- EdwardDiego 7y ago
  I liked the part where it would turn off the stall warning when the nose was too high, then turn them back on again when the nose dropped, which may have convinced the copilot that holding the stick back was helping.
- julik 7y ago
  AF447 is fascinating for other reasons as well - on Airbus it is possible for two pilots to provide directly opposite control inputs because there is no mechanical linkage between the sidesticks, unlike on yokes in most other airplanes. It does produce a warning (dual input) but it is not tactile - you cannot feel what the other crew member is doing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armavia_Flight_967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armavia_Flight_967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F5bRxTIn24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F5bRxTIn24 A pretty extreme UX issue.
sorisos 7y ago
Perhaps related crash[0] where the autopilot was disabled because it was listening to user input, in this case a child. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident
- dillonmckay 7y ago
  That was interesting and horrific.
- CydeWeys 7y ago
  Oooof. Well the real lesson there is that unqualified people (especially children) shouldn't be in the cockpit of an airliner at all. Autopilot can't be made smart enough to determine if the person operating the controls actually knows what they're doing, and thus to follow/ignore them as appropriate.
  - Ntrails 7y ago
    I mean, pick your poison. Either the humans are more reliable or the computers are. Either way is subject to some level of fallibility.
    - sean2 7y ago
      The wikipedia article calls out that the compounding sequence of issues started when autopilot was silently disabled, so the human system was in control when the pilots did not intend it to be. I think the critical issue in both cases is that the wrong system was in control against the pilots wishes. So, the pilots can pick my poison based on their training and best judgement (and maybe not put their children in control?).
- brokenmachine 7y ago
  That was because the pilots were not aware that the autopilot had been disabled. Pulling on the yoke 26 times, as hard as you possibly can, is a bit different.

jacobush 7y ago

You make it sound like the plane has some kind of agency. Though a plane is very complicated, the treacherous MCAS system is actually very simple.

tachi_coma 7y ago
I'm looking at the graph and imagining the MCAS with a bubbling, gleeful voice, not unlike that of a Tachikoma discovering something new. [0] Oh boy! A game! I love games! Like a dog with a tennis ball in its mouth, thinking the game is tug-o-war and not fetch. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNY53tZ2geg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNY53tZ2geg During the final nose down, I can hear the Tachikoma triumphantly cheer, "I WIN!"

781 7y ago

If it only were that simple. Airbus in particular has a lot of systems which PREVENT the human from doing things. One plane actually crashed because the prevention system disabled itself and the pilots believed it was still there to protect them from bad actions on their part: > caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall, from which it did not recover https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

sago 7y ago
It seems a bit rough that you're getting downvotes. [Edit: The parent was grey when I wrote this]. AF447 seems like a pretty important case study for figuring out where to put the balance of trust. Along with the very final stage of Aeroflot 593 (after the child had left the seat), also mentioned. There's a few more: Colgan Air 3407, AirAsia 8501, Korean 501, etc, where flight crew ignored or overrode systems. Which is not to deny that in the majority of cases the flight crew are the best judge of what is needed, just that one surely has to look critically and honestly at counter examples. There is of course also Germanwings 9525, though as the GP implies, systems protecting against malicious piloting will probably be counter-productive.
EdwardDiego 7y ago
I liked the part where it would turn off the stall warning when the nose was too high, then turn them back on again when the nose dropped, which may have convinced the copilot that holding the stick back was helping.
julik 7y ago
AF447 is fascinating for other reasons as well - on Airbus it is possible for two pilots to provide directly opposite control inputs because there is no mechanical linkage between the sidesticks, unlike on yokes in most other airplanes. It does produce a warning (dual input) but it is not tactile - you cannot feel what the other crew member is doing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armavia_Flight_967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armavia_Flight_967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F5bRxTIn24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F5bRxTIn24 A pretty extreme UX issue.

sorisos 7y ago

Perhaps related crash[0] where the autopilot was disabled because it was listening to user input, in this case a child. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident

dillonmckay 7y ago
That was interesting and horrific.
CydeWeys 7y ago
Oooof. Well the real lesson there is that unqualified people (especially children) shouldn't be in the cockpit of an airliner at all. Autopilot can't be made smart enough to determine if the person operating the controls actually knows what they're doing, and thus to follow/ignore them as appropriate.
- Ntrails 7y ago
  I mean, pick your poison. Either the humans are more reliable or the computers are. Either way is subject to some level of fallibility.
  - sean2 7y ago
    The wikipedia article calls out that the compounding sequence of issues started when autopilot was silently disabled, so the human system was in control when the pilots did not intend it to be. I think the critical issue in both cases is that the wrong system was in control against the pilots wishes. So, the pilots can pick my poison based on their training and best judgement (and maybe not put their children in control?).
brokenmachine 7y ago
That was because the pilots were not aware that the autopilot had been disabled. Pulling on the yoke 26 times, as hard as you possibly can, is a bit different.