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>Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic From my understanding, this was
by salawat 7y ago
>Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic
From my understanding, this was an intentional decision, as the only way they could certify the airframe without simulator training being required was to feed the MCAS with only 1 sensor.
The only way they could do that is keeping the system overall rated as hazardous, as the Catastrophic rating would require multiple redundancy plus the training.
This can be corroborated from the Australian 60 minutes expose.
>For sure there may have been pressure from management to keep MCAS out of the manual but it’s not really up to he regulatory agency to be experts on the aircraft design, if things are being hidden by the company then I’d consider this bordering on professional misconduct on the parts of the engineers overseeing this work.
That is my conclusion as well.
- spking 7y agoThanks for the tip on the AUS 60 Minutes expose. For anyone else interested: https://youtu.be/aO7_indbfME https://youtu.be/aO7_indbfME