5 ms·
If for some reason you're stuck without MFA (and I appreciate why it happens), I can't agree short expiration adds value. I've done brute force exercises. Some
by technion 7y ago
If for some reason you're stuck without MFA (and I appreciate why it happens), I can't agree short expiration adds value.
I've done brute force exercises. Some people always pick bad passwords. Tell an organisation to change every 60 days and a lot more people give up and land on May2019!.
- privateSFacct 7y agoThis 100%. I have a complicated google password - I use it no where else. I have a security key. In 12 years I've NEVER had to change my google account password AND I have not been hacked. This works well. Because google is resistant to brute force I don't even bother adding tons of weird special characters. I worked at a govt related agency. They had to change passwords every 30 days and there was a dual password requirement (one to login to the VPN, the next for the app). Result? - Many folks used a shared account with a public password emailed out every 30 days so everyone else did not have to deal with all the hassles of the password expiration dance. It was also super hard to onboard anyone new (ie, 3-4 months for staff with 12 month projects) This account ended up posted next to every computer. The idea that making security so user unfriendly will makes folks like and use security is a ridiculous approach. - Rate limit attempts - Block after 4 tries for an hour, after 8 tries till a reset - Screen against password lists - Screen out other obviously bad (ie, too short etc). - Allow hardware 2fa BUT allow staff to validate computer. This alone gets you a ton of mileage
- bigiain 7y agoSo much this. If you make your security policies into a problem for your people trying to do their work, they'll find ways to work around it. That either means 1) your policies are misplaced and you need to relax then, or 2) you need to fire everybody who creatively works around them. If your adversary is Mossad, the option 2 is the right one. If your adversary is not-Mossad, you can almost certainly have a security policy that people won't feel the need to work around. There are, of course, shades of grey below "Mossad adversaries", but in my opinion at the upper end of that you have policies that include providing every employee with a good password manager, TOTP apps/devices, and/or USB 2FA keys - and choosing services which integrate properly with them. "Change your password every X days" is an admission that you're going to leak passwords somehow, and that you only care about your data/systems enough to close the attack window down to X days. Which means you're screwed before you start, and may as well just turn everything off now.
- nwallin 7y agoI totally agree. Every time I start in a new organization, I spend some time to sit down and make a very strong password. The kind of password I would trust my retirement savings to. I'll sit down and dedicate a solid 30 minutes to transforming a bizarre but easy to remember phrase in 20-30 special characters with abbreviations instead of full words. Then I'll spend the time to commit it to muscle memory. I've done this probably 30 times over the past 20 years. 60 days later, maybe I make another new very strong password. 60 days after that, it's 8:15 and my computer is forcing me to update my password and I have an 8:30 meeting and now my password is asdfg;lkjh. 60 days later it's asdfg;lkjh1. And so on. Password expiration dates are one of those things that just don't work with human beings. It's the "work harder, not smarter" approach to security. Somebody wrote it down once, and now everybody who came along later copied the same bad checklist and added more bad things to it. Instead of working to improve the practical security of their system, they work to adhere to their arbitrary checklist. It only makes sense from the most cynical Dilbert perspective.