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I'm referring to native malware abusing admin privileges to install extensions without the user's consent, not users deliberately installing malware extensions
by MrRadar 7y ago
I'm referring to native malware abusing admin privileges to install extensions without the user's consent, not users deliberately installing malware extensions themselves. This was particularly bad in the XP/Vista era (I know I had to remove some rogue extensions from my relative's computers during that time). If the signature check were a flag the malware would just disable it at the same time it installed the extension (remember, it has admin privileges so no user interaction would be required).
Additionally, keep in mind that when the signature requirement was added there were still XUL/XPCOM extensions which could hook the browser much deeper than Chrome-style extensions and wreak much more havok.
- SilasX 7y ago>I'm referring to native malware abusing admin privileges to install extensions without the user's consent, not users deliberately installing malware extensions themselves. Ah, so a vector that required code signing doesn't protect against.
- MrRadar 7y agoSignatures absolutely do protect the user in this scenario. With mandatory signatures you can't get (obvious) malware into the browser without having it first approved by Mozilla (who should reject it upon review).
- SilasX 7y agoOkay I misunderstood what you meant by native malware. But if your threat model is that extensions can be added without the user's consent, then that is the vulnerability you should fix. And it still wouldn't justify blocking a user who is aware of the risk and chooses to disable that layer of default protection.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]