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I will try explaining this for the last time. We already live in the word where a video is not a 100% proof that something happened. Given enough time and mone

I will try explaining this for the last time. We already live in the word where a video is not a 100% proof that something happened. Given enough time and money you can use video editing, actors and CGI do show almost anything. This does not, however, completely invalidate all videos as evidence, because the cost of faking something is fairly high. Deep fakes can potentially decrease the cost of impersonation of someone in any video to almost nothing. To mitigate that we can introduce additional technologies that will bring the cost of video impersonation back up, effectively restoring the current status quo. Like most security, it's all about the costs involved in attacks and mitigations. I remember the time where most of HN visitors understood this very well.

buildzr 7y ago
That has nothing to do with the comment you responded to: Can you explain what you mean as the distinction between "content creators" and "some arbitrary video online" if the same technology is used to "authenticate" both? > Like most security, it's all about the costs involved in attacks and mitigations. Ignoring the fact that this could likely be done fairly cheaply, unlike other security improvements this actually weakens the next layer down substantially, faked content that does beat the system introduces a new seal of approval on that content. I don't want to see people get convicted because footage that's later found out to be faked has a green checkmark when the jury watches it.