4 ms·

My point wasn't that docker exec is vulnerable, it's that you were to write a script like: % docker exec ctr tar cf - some/path | tar xf - it would be vulne

by cyphar 7y ago

My point wasn't that docker exec is vulnerable, it's that you were to write a script like: % docker exec ctr tar cf - some/path | tar xf - it would be vulnerable to attack, because the container process could ptrace(2) the tar process and then change its output to cause the host-side tar to start overwriting host files. My point is that you have to be careful if you're designing a system where the security depends on running a process inside the container and trusting its output -- ideally you wouldn't run any process inside the container at all so that an attacking process can have no impact on it. And that's true even if we assume that the "tar" is not a binary that the container has direct control of. This concern also applies if you aren't using tar and are instead using some other technique. Hell, even if you don't have an IPC system you could still probably attack a process that is just trying to do a single open(2) call -- you just need to make it pass a different fd.

paulfurtado 7y ago
My argument is that the kernel gives us namespaces, seccomp, selinux, apparmor, etc for isolation and attempting to implement all of the path resolution and permission checking from a privileged context outside of the container defeats all of that and requires reimplementing all of those guards from userspace, which feels futile. By using tar, you're left with serialized path strings and file contents rather than file descriptors, and it should be far easier to sanitize those strings than deal with the linux filesystem API. I definitely recognize that the container process could ptrace the tar process, and with kubectl cp, it's even directly using whatever tar binary is in the container so tar could easily be malicious from the start, but what it can never do is break out of the container onto the node when the tar file is not being extracted onto the node using the docker daemon's prvileges, which is extremely important for multi-tenant environments. If you executed your example command as root on the node, then yes, a vulnerability in the node's tar implementation could allow a malicious tar file to take over the node at extraction time, but tar does guard against this by default, as do standard posix user permissions: the tar extraction can happen in a completely unprivileged context. I do view tar's extraction as a valid attack surface since modern tar implementations are complex, however, that would require a tar CVE and there's no reason that `docker cp`'s output target handling is any less vulnerable to the same problems. I really think the most important thing to guard against is at input time.
- cyphar 7y ago
  "kubectl cp" has had security bugs in the past[1] that are very in-line with what I just outlined (I didn't know this beforehand -- but I would've guessed it was vulnerable if they hadn't seen this issue before). In fact the fix in [1] doesn't look entirely complete to me -- it seems to me you could further mess with the output. I agree that we should use security in depth (and all of those kernel facilities are great), but actually joining the container itself is not a good idea -- you need to treat it as the enemy. I am not in favour of implementing them all in userspace, this is why I'm working on new kernel facilities to restrict path resolution. [1]: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75037 https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75037

by cyphar 7y ago

paulfurtado 7y ago

My argument is that the kernel gives us namespaces, seccomp, selinux, apparmor, etc for isolation and attempting to implement all of the path resolution and permission checking from a privileged context outside of the container defeats all of that and requires reimplementing all of those guards from userspace, which feels futile. By using tar, you're left with serialized path strings and file contents rather than file descriptors, and it should be far easier to sanitize those strings than deal with the linux filesystem API. I definitely recognize that the container process could ptrace the tar process, and with kubectl cp, it's even directly using whatever tar binary is in the container so tar could easily be malicious from the start, but what it can never do is break out of the container onto the node when the tar file is not being extracted onto the node using the docker daemon's prvileges, which is extremely important for multi-tenant environments. If you executed your example command as root on the node, then yes, a vulnerability in the node's tar implementation could allow a malicious tar file to take over the node at extraction time, but tar does guard against this by default, as do standard posix user permissions: the tar extraction can happen in a completely unprivileged context. I do view tar's extraction as a valid attack surface since modern tar implementations are complex, however, that would require a tar CVE and there's no reason that `docker cp`'s output target handling is any less vulnerable to the same problems. I really think the most important thing to guard against is at input time.

cyphar 7y ago
"kubectl cp" has had security bugs in the past[1] that are very in-line with what I just outlined (I didn't know this beforehand -- but I would've guessed it was vulnerable if they hadn't seen this issue before). In fact the fix in [1] doesn't look entirely complete to me -- it seems to me you could further mess with the output. I agree that we should use security in depth (and all of those kernel facilities are great), but actually joining the container itself is not a good idea -- you need to treat it as the enemy. I am not in favour of implementing them all in userspace, this is why I'm working on new kernel facilities to restrict path resolution. [1]: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75037 https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75037