4 ms·
> How much do you trust ... I trust them no less than I trust the domain resellers who administer DNS. It used to be that all you had to do to be a CA was kno
by jcranmer 7y ago
> How much do you trust ...
I trust them no less than I trust the domain resellers who administer DNS.
It used to be that all you had to do to be a CA was knock on some browsers' doors and say "I'm a CA, plz add me, kthxbai." But that hasn't been true for quite some time; now you have to go through audits and several other hoops to be added to the lists, and miscompliance results in browsers dropping often fatal ban hammers, as DigiNotar and WoSign can attest. Browsers have also developed fairly stringent policies for enforcing minimum cryptographic rules and audit mechanisms that allow for strong policies.
The goal of many DANE proponents is to replace the entire CA infrastructure and PKI system, but they haven't really put in the work to actually demonstrate the ability of clients to enforce strong policies in practice. The root keys are no longer unacceptably weak, but there is still a proliferation of weak keys. And it's not like DNS providers have done a good job of actually enforcing policies around things like name spoofing or enforcing UTS#46 validity.
Instead, we're just supposed to take it at their word that DNS providers make better CAs than our current CAs, and drop all of the auditing and the like that happens today. And if the Libyan government decides it wants to MITM a popular link shortener, we're supposed to just shrug our shoulders and say "nothing we can do," I guess.
- throwaway2048 7y agoAt least the Libyan government can only MITM .ly in DANE world, and not a Libyan CA and consequently every other domain in existence.
- comex 7y agoAlso, if the Libyan government decides they want to seize the domain of a popular link shortener (like the US government has seized some domains under US TLDs), they can just get a certificate from Let’s Encrypt. The Web PKI system isn’t really set up to stop them from doing that. The only scenario where the current CA system possibly has an advantage is if they apply their MitM covertly, only to a subset of clients. If this is discovered, CAs who participate in the scheme can be blacklisted, whereas with centralized control you’d have to basically blacklist all of .ly…
- theamk 7y agoLet’s Encrypt participates in CT, so no, they won’t. This will be discovered, and (I guess) they will revoke the cert really quickly
- comex 7y agoThey might, but if so it would be a special exception from their usual policies. In general, deciding who owns a particular domain name is a matter for the corresponding TLD's registry. If NIC.LY decides to seize bit.ly, there's nobody that can declare that illegitimate per se, or force them to give it back. And to quote Wikipedia on the semantics of DV certificates (which are the normal kind): > The sole criterion for a domain validated certificate is proof of control over whois records, DNS records file, email or web hosting account of a domain.
- theamk 7y agoThe big difference is that in DANE, they get to MITM forever. And in current world, the MITM will be discovered and country’s registrars disabled pretty quickly.