3 ms·

DNSSEC is the only true PKI we have. It has one set of roots and is workable even if we have competing roots, provided they sign roughly the same TLDs. The DN

DNSSEC is the only true PKI we have. It has one set of roots and is workable even if we have competing roots, provided they sign roughly the same TLDs. The DNSSEC PKI is also truly hierarchical, while the WebPKI is absolutely not. The web is absolutely built on naming of services that users can mostly understand -- that is, domainnames. Users cannot understand x.500 naming. So the web absolutely needs a reliable way to authenticate domainnames. WebPKI is not reliable, no way, not even with CT. That leaves DNSSEC as the only remaining alternative. It's DNSSEC or WebPKI, and WebPKI is no good. So it's DNSSEC or nothing.

jcranmer 7y ago
> The web is absolutely built on naming of services that users can mostly understand -- that is, domainnames. Users don't actually understand domain names. If Google were to make the result of searching for "facebook" return a facebook.google.com that MITM'd Facebook, they could capture ¼-⅓ of Facebook's traffic without any software complaining about it. Your comments have a strong sense of "if we just made sure that the server is truly using the domain name, then everything would be hunky-dory." In fact, as far as I can tell from actual security problems, fully securing the domain name (or even authenticating the server properly in the first place) wouldn't improve security meaningfully for most people.
- comex 7y ago
  By your logic, why use HTTPS in the first place? (Or at least why care about certificate validation at all?) Hint: Because ISPs are in a position to intercept and even MitM traffic, but generally not in a position to decide what URLs you go to.
  - tialaramex 7y ago
    Only what is possible can be done. We have the technology to actually ensure that https://news.ycombinator.com/ https://news.ycombinator.com/ is really https://news.ycombinator.com/ https://news.ycombinator.com/ but we do not have technology that could ensure this is where you get when you type "Hacker News" into Bing. Part of what has to happen to civilisations around technology is that they adjust to what is possible. Different adjustments are possible, the egg washing thing is an example: in some countries you purchase eggs in the state they're laid (which means sometimes there is dirt on the shell), and you don't keep them in a refrigerator; in other countries you purchase eggs "washed" clean and they're refrigerated. Either of these approaches works fine, but mixing them up doesn't work. So, for example, teaching people to bookmark sites is an adjustment that works with our technology, whereas teaching them to get everywhere by following sponsored links on Google not so much. WebAuthn is another example. A Security Key doesn't care that you thought mybnak.example was your bank, doesn't care if you got there from a phishing email, from a bogus advert or you just can't spell when typing. It will resolutely refuse to provide mybnak.example with your mybank.example credentials because those strings are not the same. You can press the button over and over, swear, throw things, but because it's based on the URL it won't let you screw yourself.
  - jcranmer 7y ago
    > By your logic, why use HTTPS in the first place? (Or at least why care about certificate validation at all?) Privacy is valuable and relevant, and you need some modicum of authentication to get privacy. The main threat here is "someone who's watching all the traffic go by on the coffee shop wifi"
- kryogen1c 7y ago
  I work in IT and confidently say that if you MITMd\phished Facebook traffic to resolve to notFacebook.imstealingyourshit.com you'd get your 1\4 to 1\3 results. If you spoofed an idn that looked like Façebook.com, you get damn near 100%

jcranmer 7y ago

> The web is absolutely built on naming of services that users can mostly understand -- that is, domainnames. Users don't actually understand domain names. If Google were to make the result of searching for "facebook" return a facebook.google.com that MITM'd Facebook, they could capture ¼-⅓ of Facebook's traffic without any software complaining about it. Your comments have a strong sense of "if we just made sure that the server is truly using the domain name, then everything would be hunky-dory." In fact, as far as I can tell from actual security problems, fully securing the domain name (or even authenticating the server properly in the first place) wouldn't improve security meaningfully for most people.

comex 7y ago
By your logic, why use HTTPS in the first place? (Or at least why care about certificate validation at all?) Hint: Because ISPs are in a position to intercept and even MitM traffic, but generally not in a position to decide what URLs you go to.
- tialaramex 7y ago
  Only what is possible can be done. We have the technology to actually ensure that https://news.ycombinator.com/ https://news.ycombinator.com/ is really https://news.ycombinator.com/ https://news.ycombinator.com/ but we do not have technology that could ensure this is where you get when you type "Hacker News" into Bing. Part of what has to happen to civilisations around technology is that they adjust to what is possible. Different adjustments are possible, the egg washing thing is an example: in some countries you purchase eggs in the state they're laid (which means sometimes there is dirt on the shell), and you don't keep them in a refrigerator; in other countries you purchase eggs "washed" clean and they're refrigerated. Either of these approaches works fine, but mixing them up doesn't work. So, for example, teaching people to bookmark sites is an adjustment that works with our technology, whereas teaching them to get everywhere by following sponsored links on Google not so much. WebAuthn is another example. A Security Key doesn't care that you thought mybnak.example was your bank, doesn't care if you got there from a phishing email, from a bogus advert or you just can't spell when typing. It will resolutely refuse to provide mybnak.example with your mybank.example credentials because those strings are not the same. You can press the button over and over, swear, throw things, but because it's based on the URL it won't let you screw yourself.
- jcranmer 7y ago
  > By your logic, why use HTTPS in the first place? (Or at least why care about certificate validation at all?) Privacy is valuable and relevant, and you need some modicum of authentication to get privacy. The main threat here is "someone who's watching all the traffic go by on the coffee shop wifi"
kryogen1c 7y ago
I work in IT and confidently say that if you MITMd\phished Facebook traffic to resolve to notFacebook.imstealingyourshit.com you'd get your 1\4 to 1\3 results. If you spoofed an idn that looked like Façebook.com, you get damn near 100%