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Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. However, I suspect that many non-philisophers are happy to appeal to reason as a source of normative bel

Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. However, I suspect that many non-philisophers are happy to appeal to reason as a source of normative beliefs, thus “facts don’t care about your feelings” (well quite—they are incapable of caring), complaints about the irrationality of populists, &c.

Nasrudith 7y ago
Reason as a guidance for beliefs makes perfect sense - they are the constraints for what is possible. When it comes to actions it is the how and not the why. It isn't wrong to use it in that way as a source of some beliefs. That you won't be able to build a skyscraper just by drawing blueprints is reason. However it doesn't include the motivations - only how they may be served or if the goals and outcomes are out of alignment.
- heraclius 7y ago
  By normative beliefs I refer to your “motivations”, not intermediate ends.
woodruffw 7y ago
> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Relatively few serious philosophers disagree with the positive component of Hume's claim: that reason is (for many people, at least) the slave the passions. On the other hand, many philosophers disagree with the normative component: that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, or that it must be so. Hume himself has a thing or two to say about juxtaposing is-ought claims in such a manner ;) Of course, you're absolutely right about non-philosophers using "reason" and "logic" as a rhetorical cudgels. We should recognize their (poetically) broken and faithless reasoning and point it out as such.
- adrianratnapala 7y ago
  > that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. > or that it must be so This is a factual, not a normative claim.
  - n4r9 7y ago
    The quote is in fact > Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions... However, given the context, I suspect that the use of the word "ought" here has a slightly different meaning than we tend to infer these days.
  - woodruffw 7y ago
    > I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. I don't disagree with the second part. But the ought is explicit in THN, like 'n4r9 says below. I can think of two (definitely not the only two) plausible interpretations: 1. Reason is necessarily the slave of the passions. If so, there is no sensible way in which it ought be, since normative claims require that a thing could be otherwise. If Hume truly means that, then his "ought" is probably more of an admonishment against trying (and inevitably failing) to usurp the passions. This is a different sense, but I think it's close enough in kind to justify the interpretation. 2. Reason't isn't necessarily the slave of the passions. This makes the "ought" clause more intelligible from my position, but isn't really supported by Hume's account of moral action (i.e., how we find ourselves driven to it). > This is a factual, not a normative claim. It's normative in the context of the "admonishment" interpretation above. But yeah, not from #2.
yters 7y ago
Very few modern philosophers, perhaps. Starting at least with Plato, it was entirely the opposite, that the individual whose passions are completely controlled by reason is ultimately happy. The individual controlled completely by his passions is the most unhappy. This is because Plato believed supreme happiness was found in perceiving the good itself using reason. Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. Note, this was not an innovation on Hume's side. A number of philosophers before and during Plato's time proposed similar ideas, such as Epicurus. So, we cannot say Hume came up with a brilliant idea no one had ever considered before. However, for whatever reason, most of the philosophers of the Western canon sided with Plato rather than with Hume. Perhaps because Plato was closer to the truth than Hume.
- woodruffw 7y ago
  > Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. I don't think this chain of reasoning is consistent with Hume's. Hume is an empiricist, not a nominalist: he doesn't deny the existence of abstract categories, only their a priori intelligibility. He also makes direct reference to non-physical, desirable things (it's been a while, but I'm pretty sure approbation and praise are his chief examples). We're ruled by our passions not because our ends are always physical, but because (according to Hume) (1) reason alone cannot lead us to action and (2) we clearly are lead to action all the time. Therefore, something else must be driving us.
  - yters 7y ago
    In that case he seems to not believe in free will. Free will is necessary to choose abstract concepts for their own sake, since as he notes only physical passions can drive us to take involuntary action. At any rate, it seems to be all part of the same package, at least to me. As a side point, I've noticed that pretty much all these cutting edge, modern ideas that we believe have overthrown the ideas of the past were all around at the same time as Plato. In fact, a number of dialogues deal with debating concepts such as relativism, scientism, Nietszche's will to power, Kant's idea that we are trapped by mental constructs, etc. Intelligent design was even a big thing, and apparently was what started Socrate's on his philosophic quest. Reading through modern philosophy strikes me as pretty mundane, and it seems as if these modern philosophers were really myopic and either never read classic philosophy (most probably did) or just picked out the pieces they liked and ignored the counter arguments. Then they get paraded around as if they are brilliant innovators to an audience that doesn't know any better.
jonathanstrange 7y ago
> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Well, "very few" is always in the eye of the beholder, but I'd like to challenge this a little bit. The majority is Humean, I agree with that, but there are a number of non-Humean moral philosophers about moral motivation, for example Scanlon and Shafer-Landau. It's actually an ongoing and long-standing debate and with good arguments for both sides. The SEP article on moral motivation summarizes part of the debate.[1] [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAntHum https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAnt...

Nasrudith 7y ago

Reason as a guidance for beliefs makes perfect sense - they are the constraints for what is possible. When it comes to actions it is the how and not the why. It isn't wrong to use it in that way as a source of some beliefs. That you won't be able to build a skyscraper just by drawing blueprints is reason. However it doesn't include the motivations - only how they may be served or if the goals and outcomes are out of alignment.

heraclius 7y ago
By normative beliefs I refer to your “motivations”, not intermediate ends.

woodruffw 7y ago

> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Relatively few serious philosophers disagree with the positive component of Hume's claim: that reason is (for many people, at least) the slave the passions. On the other hand, many philosophers disagree with the normative component: that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, or that it must be so. Hume himself has a thing or two to say about juxtaposing is-ought claims in such a manner ;) Of course, you're absolutely right about non-philosophers using "reason" and "logic" as a rhetorical cudgels. We should recognize their (poetically) broken and faithless reasoning and point it out as such.

adrianratnapala 7y ago
> that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. > or that it must be so This is a factual, not a normative claim.
- n4r9 7y ago
  The quote is in fact > Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions... However, given the context, I suspect that the use of the word "ought" here has a slightly different meaning than we tend to infer these days.
- woodruffw 7y ago
  > I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. I don't disagree with the second part. But the ought is explicit in THN, like 'n4r9 says below. I can think of two (definitely not the only two) plausible interpretations: 1. Reason is necessarily the slave of the passions. If so, there is no sensible way in which it ought be, since normative claims require that a thing could be otherwise. If Hume truly means that, then his "ought" is probably more of an admonishment against trying (and inevitably failing) to usurp the passions. This is a different sense, but I think it's close enough in kind to justify the interpretation. 2. Reason't isn't necessarily the slave of the passions. This makes the "ought" clause more intelligible from my position, but isn't really supported by Hume's account of moral action (i.e., how we find ourselves driven to it). > This is a factual, not a normative claim. It's normative in the context of the "admonishment" interpretation above. But yeah, not from #2.

yters 7y ago

Very few modern philosophers, perhaps. Starting at least with Plato, it was entirely the opposite, that the individual whose passions are completely controlled by reason is ultimately happy. The individual controlled completely by his passions is the most unhappy. This is because Plato believed supreme happiness was found in perceiving the good itself using reason. Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. Note, this was not an innovation on Hume's side. A number of philosophers before and during Plato's time proposed similar ideas, such as Epicurus. So, we cannot say Hume came up with a brilliant idea no one had ever considered before. However, for whatever reason, most of the philosophers of the Western canon sided with Plato rather than with Hume. Perhaps because Plato was closer to the truth than Hume.

woodruffw 7y ago
> Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. I don't think this chain of reasoning is consistent with Hume's. Hume is an empiricist, not a nominalist: he doesn't deny the existence of abstract categories, only their a priori intelligibility. He also makes direct reference to non-physical, desirable things (it's been a while, but I'm pretty sure approbation and praise are his chief examples). We're ruled by our passions not because our ends are always physical, but because (according to Hume) (1) reason alone cannot lead us to action and (2) we clearly are lead to action all the time. Therefore, something else must be driving us.
- yters 7y ago
  In that case he seems to not believe in free will. Free will is necessary to choose abstract concepts for their own sake, since as he notes only physical passions can drive us to take involuntary action. At any rate, it seems to be all part of the same package, at least to me. As a side point, I've noticed that pretty much all these cutting edge, modern ideas that we believe have overthrown the ideas of the past were all around at the same time as Plato. In fact, a number of dialogues deal with debating concepts such as relativism, scientism, Nietszche's will to power, Kant's idea that we are trapped by mental constructs, etc. Intelligent design was even a big thing, and apparently was what started Socrate's on his philosophic quest. Reading through modern philosophy strikes me as pretty mundane, and it seems as if these modern philosophers were really myopic and either never read classic philosophy (most probably did) or just picked out the pieces they liked and ignored the counter arguments. Then they get paraded around as if they are brilliant innovators to an audience that doesn't know any better.

jonathanstrange 7y ago

> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Well, "very few" is always in the eye of the beholder, but I'd like to challenge this a little bit. The majority is Humean, I agree with that, but there are a number of non-Humean moral philosophers about moral motivation, for example Scanlon and Shafer-Landau. It's actually an ongoing and long-standing debate and with good arguments for both sides. The SEP article on moral motivation summarizes part of the debate.[1] [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAntHum https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAnt...