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Is reason the slave of the passions?
- whatshisface 7y ago>But if we are sensible, the pursuit of human happiness, personal and collective, remains the goal of most of what we do. Such a basically utilitarian ideology requires around it a structure of reasoning, not passion, selfish or unselfish. David Hume's point was that reason alone could not justify the pursuit of human happiness or anything else, because it only lets you go from one statement to another, which means you have to start with something like "I want to be happy" in order to conclude "I want to buy some ice cream." The contributor writing the dissenting opinion didn't say anything that Hume wouldn't have agreed with, because they slipped in Hume's passions with the word "sensible." I think they are debating a non-issue that they don't really disagree about. Although Hume's point was novel when he wrote it (believe it or not there were contemporaneous philosophers who did not realize that you couldn't derive axioms), there is really nobody who thinks anything else today.
- heraclius 7y agoVery few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. However, I suspect that many non-philisophers are happy to appeal to reason as a source of normative beliefs, thus “facts don’t care about your feelings” (well quite—they are incapable of caring), complaints about the irrationality of populists, &c.
- Nasrudith 7y agoReason as a guidance for beliefs makes perfect sense - they are the constraints for what is possible. When it comes to actions it is the how and not the why. It isn't wrong to use it in that way as a source of some beliefs. That you won't be able to build a skyscraper just by drawing blueprints is reason. However it doesn't include the motivations - only how they may be served or if the goals and outcomes are out of alignment.
- heraclius 7y agoBy normative beliefs I refer to your “motivations”, not intermediate ends.
- woodruffw 7y ago> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Relatively few serious philosophers disagree with the positive component of Hume's claim: that reason is (for many people, at least) the slave the passions. On the other hand, many philosophers disagree with the normative component: that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, or that it must be so. Hume himself has a thing or two to say about juxtaposing is-ought claims in such a manner ;) Of course, you're absolutely right about non-philosophers using "reason" and "logic" as a rhetorical cudgels. We should recognize their (poetically) broken and faithless reasoning and point it out as such.
- adrianratnapala 7y ago> that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. > or that it must be so This is a factual, not a normative claim.
- n4r9 7y agoThe quote is in fact > Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions... However, given the context, I suspect that the use of the word "ought" here has a slightly different meaning than we tend to infer these days.
- woodruffw 7y ago> I don't think you will find Hume actually arguing this. People read this into him because they glide so easily from is to ought. I don't disagree with the second part. But the ought is explicit in THN, like 'n4r9 says below. I can think of two (definitely not the only two) plausible interpretations: 1. Reason is necessarily the slave of the passions. If so, there is no sensible way in which it ought be, since normative claims require that a thing could be otherwise. If Hume truly means that, then his "ought" is probably more of an admonishment against trying (and inevitably failing) to usurp the passions. This is a different sense, but I think it's close enough in kind to justify the interpretation. 2. Reason't isn't necessarily the slave of the passions. This makes the "ought" clause more intelligible from my position, but isn't really supported by Hume's account of moral action (i.e., how we find ourselves driven to it). > This is a factual, not a normative claim. It's normative in the context of the "admonishment" interpretation above. But yeah, not from #2.
- yters 7y agoVery few modern philosophers, perhaps. Starting at least with Plato, it was entirely the opposite, that the individual whose passions are completely controlled by reason is ultimately happy. The individual controlled completely by his passions is the most unhappy. This is because Plato believed supreme happiness was found in perceiving the good itself using reason. Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. Note, this was not an innovation on Hume's side. A number of philosophers before and during Plato's time proposed similar ideas, such as Epicurus. So, we cannot say Hume came up with a brilliant idea no one had ever considered before. However, for whatever reason, most of the philosophers of the Western canon sided with Plato rather than with Hume. Perhaps because Plato was closer to the truth than Hume.
- woodruffw 7y ago> Nominalists, such as Hume, don't believe there is such a thing as 'good itself', and believe all mental abstractions are merely labelings of physical things. Thus, mental abstractions cannot be the goal of our desire. Only physical things can be the goal of our desire, and we must necessarily be ruled by our passions. I don't think this chain of reasoning is consistent with Hume's. Hume is an empiricist, not a nominalist: he doesn't deny the existence of abstract categories, only their a priori intelligibility. He also makes direct reference to non-physical, desirable things (it's been a while, but I'm pretty sure approbation and praise are his chief examples). We're ruled by our passions not because our ends are always physical, but because (according to Hume) (1) reason alone cannot lead us to action and (2) we clearly are lead to action all the time. Therefore, something else must be driving us.
- yters 7y agoIn that case he seems to not believe in free will. Free will is necessary to choose abstract concepts for their own sake, since as he notes only physical passions can drive us to take involuntary action. At any rate, it seems to be all part of the same package, at least to me. As a side point, I've noticed that pretty much all these cutting edge, modern ideas that we believe have overthrown the ideas of the past were all around at the same time as Plato. In fact, a number of dialogues deal with debating concepts such as relativism, scientism, Nietszche's will to power, Kant's idea that we are trapped by mental constructs, etc. Intelligent design was even a big thing, and apparently was what started Socrate's on his philosophic quest. Reading through modern philosophy strikes me as pretty mundane, and it seems as if these modern philosophers were really myopic and either never read classic philosophy (most probably did) or just picked out the pieces they liked and ignored the counter arguments. Then they get paraded around as if they are brilliant innovators to an audience that doesn't know any better.
- jonathanstrange 7y ago> Very few serious philosophers would disagree with Hume. Well, "very few" is always in the eye of the beholder, but I'd like to challenge this a little bit. The majority is Humean, I agree with that, but there are a number of non-Humean moral philosophers about moral motivation, for example Scanlon and Shafer-Landau. It's actually an ongoing and long-standing debate and with good arguments for both sides. The SEP article on moral motivation summarizes part of the debate.[1] [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAntHum https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#HumVAnt...
- ibeckermayer 7y agoIt's true that desires aren't justified by reason in and of themselves, but I don't think that's ultimately relevant (morally or otherwise). It's an empirical fact that we must act on our desires; when I examine my actions closely I notice that all of them can be traced back to some desire or combination of desires. From that empirically derived fact I posit that we can say the question "can reason alone justify the pursuit of our desires?" is a non-sensical question, like asking "is gravity justified in making objects fall to earth?" I think a valid question along this line of inquiry is "are the actions I am taking in pursuit of my desires justified?". Actions are embodiments of ideas about how to act, and like other ideas can be deemed justified or unjustified through rational analysis. If an action embodies an idea that contradicts a known truth, it can be deemed unjustified.
- adrianratnapala 7y ago> It's an empirical fact that we must act on our desires; Is it? > when I examine my actions closely I notice that all of them can be traced back to some desire or combination of desires. But when I introspect, the opposite happens. When I examine my desires closely, they disappear and I am left with "well I often engage in X, Y and Z goal-seeking behaviours."
- sooheon 7y agoIf you grant that motivation for actions have two components, causal and stochastic, and ignore the stochastic element as just error, I could see labeling all causal impetuses as "desires" at some level. Anything you do, you do because the conscious you--or some lower level process that is a part of you--"wanted" it that way, give or take some random noise.
- n4r9 7y agoIndeed, a desire is ultimately the habit of seeking a particular goal. The comment you replied to stands regardless.
- ibeckermayer 7y agoDon't “goal-seeking behaviors” imply desire? I can’t imagine a goal I might seek that isn’t a desire itself or connected closely to a desire.
- alfredallan2 7y agoThe crux of the matter is that "reason" is not absolute. People rarely do things that they (at the moment of committing the act) believe to be unreasonable - generally, every action taken seems quite reasonable "at the moment". It is only retrospectively that they realize that their past actions/thoughts were unreasonable. There is a very nice discussion on the relativity of rationality in the book "Instincts of the herd in peace and war" by Trotter. I copy a relevant paragraph below: The religious man accuses the atheist of being shallow and irrational, and is met by a similar reply ; to the Conservative, the amazing thing about the Liberal is his incapacity to see reason and accept the only possible solution of public problems. Examination reveals the fact that the differences are not due to the commission of the mere mechanical fallacies of logic, since these are easily avoided, even by the politician, and since there is no reason to suppose that one party in such controversies is less logical than the other. The difference is due rather to the fundamental assumptions of the antagonists being hostile, and these assumptions are derived from herd suggestion ; to the Liberal, certain basal conceptions have acquired the quality of instinctive truth, have become " a priori syntheses," because of the accumulated suggestions to which he has been exposed, and a similar explanation applies to the atheist, the Christian, and the Conservative. Each, it is important to remember, finds in consequence the rationality of his position flawless, and is quite incapable of detecting in it the fallacies which are obvious to his opponent, to whom that particular series of assumptions has not been rendered acceptable by herd suggestion.
- GnarfGnarf 7y agoThe human race perpetuates because of the insanity induced by hormones.
- el_dev_hell 7y agoSeems to work pretty well for an insane/chaotic system.
- Chris_Chambers 7y agoIt doesn’t need to be efficient because the sun supplements it with an endless supply of free energy.
- HNLurker2 7y agoThis reminds me of schopenhauer will as a representation. Very pessimistic saying that the will to live is primal and intelligence secondary to fulfill the first. I am surprised you talked about Kant and Hume but never mention Schopenhauer (lack of expertise by author?)
- mbrock 7y agoIt sort of seems like philosophers tend to fetishize either reason or emotion or both, and maybe underestimate some more basic aspects related to attention and caring. I think Heidegger had some critiques like this. When I go about my normal life I am typically not driven by tendencies that are clearly rational or emotional but more kind of a mundane absorption with motivational roots in past decisions and events. I am also absorbed in various structures that shape the "grammar" of my behavior, exemplified by language and society. My capacity for "reason" goes up and down depending on my mental health, my attention span, my general clarity of presence; the same is true for "emotion." And philosophical reason is quite different from everyday planning and executive function. You could argue that dopaminergic activity in the prefrontal cortex is a "passion" while it is also the substrate of the ability to be reasonable. I don't have a clear point here but something seems sort of silly and old-fashioned about this debate.
- rdiddly 7y agoIt's old-fashioned because it's from Plato. It would probably help a lot to unlearn that.
- devoply 7y agoReasonable is simply acting in line with whatever mythology your society has adopted. It's reasonable to kill people for insulting a sacred man (an act of passion) while elsewhere it's considered a right to do so (another act of passion). We "reason" using the cultural norms, and those norms are anything but actually norms, they are mythologies that makes societies function. You can not reason outside the cultural norms, like for instance you can't reason within Nazi cultural norms in modern Germany. It's impossible. Reasoning is simply a method to socialize with people with whatever cockamamie idea they currently consider a norm. Outside of that in certain other domains we have the ability to reason like for instance in engineering or programming, and there is no way to avoid reasoning about these things as they have very specific truth conditions... that are persistent and inescapable.
- devoply 7y agoWhen your main mode of political reasoning is reasoning about myths that you compartmentalize... It's obvious that in terms of politics there is no reason, it's simply what you or your society want to believe to justify what you want to do... and what you want to do is what you desire. And what you desire is a function of your passions.
- atulatul 7y agoThis point was also deliberated in "The Righteous Mind". May be worth a read. Plus, I like the observation from Maugham's Of Human Bondage: The submission to passion is human bondage, but the exercise of reason is human liberty. https://www.amazon.com/Righteous-Mind-Divided-Politics-Religion/dp/B008OEMNNQ https://www.amazon.com/Righteous-Mind-Divided-Politics-Relig... https://www.amazon.com/Of-Human-Bondage/dp/B004N59WMK/ https://www.amazon.com/Of-Human-Bondage/dp/B004N59WMK/
- kd5bjo 7y agoI will do what I will do And what I do shows me what I want to do. I am but an adviser to myself, Trusted but reluctantly.