> "The article is precisely about this" No, I don't believe it is. The point debunked over and over again by Troy in this and other articles of his is the supp

> "The article is precisely about this" No, I don't believe it is. The point debunked over and over again by Troy in this and other articles of his is the supposed anti-phishing aspect of EV certs: that because the browser shows the company name separate from the url, the user can know that they're really at e.g. Amazon and not amaz0n.com. I'm referring to a very specific situation that is much more rarely mentioned: when you are using a computer with a managed cert store (usually a company computer behind a firewall) and you want to know if the site you are visiting is getting "legitimately" (per company policy) SSL-sniffed by a network appliance. This is completely different from phishing attacks or whether you think you are at the real Amazon. All you need to do is go to a single site that you know has EV and see if it shows up as EV in the browser. Sure, they could selectively sniff, but in practice I believe most companies that do this have an all or nothing approach.