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I found the linked page from ian.sh is extremely instructive. [1] Especially the part about how some browsers hide the domain name when the EV certificate is in
by brobdingnagians 7y ago
I found the linked page from ian.sh is extremely instructive. [1] Especially the part about how some browsers hide the domain name when the EV certificate is in use.
I'm with a company that uses EV certificate for our site, mostly just to "look even more trustworthy", even though it functionally servers very little purpose for us, and in an industry where I doubt very few clients know what it really is. For large companies the cost of an EV certificate is negligible. If someone wanted to impersonate us, they would only need to change a letter or two and get a similar `.com` domain, which would be easy to do since we have a somewhat unusual name.
The linked article also talks about the possibility of people getting a shortened domain name like `g.uk` for phishing. If a company has a wide portfolio of sites, that becomes even easier since it weakens peoples association between a canonical domain and the company.
I guess the main point is that the DNS records themselves are one of the most effective preventions of phishing since you need a mapping from a user intent to the site they arrived at. Domain names provide a memorable and easily "mentally verifiable" method of mapping from "facebook.com" -> Social Media, "gmail.com" -> Email, etc. for most people. But strings of characters are also vulnerable since they can be easily changed by a transposition, or other operation, to create a new domain name that looks _very_ similar. Since our minds are much better at recognizing words by the beginning and end, they are vulnerable to changes in letters in the middle.
It makes one wonder if there is a system that would allow much easier mental verifiability of that mapping, but which would still allow a large number of possibilities. Or whitelisting sites that you regularly visit and alerting an individual on sites not in the whitelist or which _resemble_ sites in the whitelist.
[1] https://www.typewritten.net/writer/ev-phishing/ https://www.typewritten.net/writer/ev-phishing/
EDIT: just to make clear, I think strings and domain checking mentally is a terrible model for verifying trust. But at least it kinda works some of the time, even though there are tons of vulnerabilities and problems. But probably better than typing in raw IP addresses, most of the time.
- JohnFen 7y ago> Especially the part about how some browsers hide the domain name when the EV certificate is in use. This drives me nuts. Browsers should never hide the domain name (or any other part of the URL).
- judge2020 7y agoThankfully even iOS (I believe starting with 12.2) no longer hides the full domain name when EV is present, but EV will still make the domain's characters turn green.
- tialaramex 7y agoSecurity Keys fix the problem of credentials getting phished by making them unphishable (a Security Key will let you give evilguy.example credentials, but only for evilguy.example, they are utterly useless for facebook.com or goodguy.example or any other site, it dumbly refuses to help you give Evil Guy your real goodguy.example credentials) More subtle manipulations from phishing remain possible, but they're trickier to pull off than just stealing people's passwords. IIRC somebody has a proof like with Arrow's theorem - that the perfect desirable set of features for names can't be achieved, but I can't find it. Certainly you can see a different trade in Tor hidden services for example, bad guys can't get a name arbitrarily similar to yours, but your name is also mostly gibberish, so your users probably don't remember what it is anyway. Did they buy the last bag from greatweedxstrm4aqp.onion ? Or was it weedxgreatstre6g2q.onion ? And unlike conventional Phishing the plan is probably to break your door down and arrest you if you pick the wrong one which sucks worse than card fraud...