Details in the research paper[1]: Recall that our approach to recover the gain matrix is based on the fact that the values in the ADC output, A, are all intege

Details in the research paper[1]: Recall that our approach to recover the gain matrix is based on the fact that the values in the ADC output, A, are all integers. This property allows us to recover the values of ΔA using Equation 6. However, if we add random noise ε ∈ R3×1, from the uniform distribution in the range [−0.5, 0.5], to each ADC output A. Then we have: O = G(A + ε) + B (12) It is clear to see that the application of random noise with distribution ε ∼ U (−0.5, 0.5) followed by a truncation of the output down to 16-bit resolution means there is no easy way to recover the values of ΔA. Therefore, attackers can no longer generate the SENSORID using the approach described in this paper. The cost of adding ε is negligible in most cases, but it offers significant advantages in terms of user privacy. Alternatively, we could round the factory calibrated sensor output to the nearest multiple of the nominal gain to prevent recovering the gain matrix. This approach is more practical to apply and it does not require knowing the gain matrix in advance. Therefore, mobile browsers can adopt this approach to protect user privacy. 1. https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2019/papers/405.pdf https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2019/papers/405.pdf