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Yes indeed [0]. [0] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/feature/guides/lawful_intercept/10LIovr.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/doc

Yes indeed [0]. [0] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/feature/guides/lawful_intercept/10LIovr.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/fe...

lone_haxx0r 7y ago
So, the US having freedom really was just a meme after all.
- plazmatic 7y ago
  Everything is a meme to the plebs these days. Simplify everything for the small brains.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
- jrockway 7y ago
  TLS is still legal. So is routing all your traffic through Tor if you think the metadata is relevant. I can't imagine much useful material comes from wiretapping these days. Maybe once in a while, but the real value largely exists in the application layer, which is obtained in a different way.
  - crehn 7y ago
    When TLS is everywhere, what's the most reasonable way for law enforcement to surveil suspects?
    - parliament32 7y ago
      Bottom-up. The FBI sees that you're having a TLS conversation at X time with a server in Facebook's IP range, so they just go ask Facebook for what you were doing at that time. Foreign-hosted services seem like they'd be hard to crack, but it's extremely likely their data flows though Cloudflare, Amazon, GCE, or a similar US-based company.
- Angostura 7y ago
  Following the requirements of a judge is not necessarily antithetical to Freedom. Even in societies where freedom is values, conspiracy to murder (say) tends to be frowned upon.
  - lone_haxx0r 7y ago
    But Cisco hasn't conspired to murder anyone.
Gaelan 7y ago
Doesn’t seem like a backdoor AFIACT—just support for handling a request from the government. (Distinction being that the ISP manually tells their equipment to intercept data instead of the government having technical access.)
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
rayiner 7y ago
Lawful Intercept is not a backdoor: > The surveillance is performed through the use of wiretaps on traditional telecommunications and Internet services in voice, data, and multiservice networks. The LEA delivers a request for a wiretap to the target's service provider, who is responsible for intercepting data communication to and from the individual. The service provider uses the target's IP address or session to determine which of its edge routers handles the target's traffic (data communication). The service provider then intercepts the target's traffic as it passes through the router, and sends a copy of the intercepted traffic to the LEA without the target's knowledge. Responding to lawful warrants and subpoenas is everyone’s obligation, and has been for hundreds of years under American law, and English law before that. The government is entitled to almost any evidence—it just has to follow the proper process to get it. Lawful intercept just supports that process. That’s also why the FBI having access to US data is fundamentally different than Chinese back doors in US networks. US law enforcement has legal ways to access data flowing in networks to perform their legitimate law enforcement functions. The Chinese have no legitimate reason to access data in US networks.
- windexh8er 7y ago
  Lawful intercept isn't itself a backdoor, but it did provide one that was exposed via Snowden. In this case I'll call a spade a spade: many lawful intercept tools were used as backdoors, or overreach of legal authority. Again, keep in mind the context of my original comment: the years 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. The FBI may have stepped in with a heavy hand for many reasons but those reasons may have included inclusion of another large ISP in programs like PRISM.
  - tptacek 7y ago
    PRISM was literally a system for handling the paperwork for lawful intercepts. There are instances of the USG exceeding its authority, but you've somehow managed to cite one of the few leaked programs that had an almost purely lawful purpose.
    - windexh8er 7y ago

Yes indeed [0]. [0] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/feature/guides/lawful_intercept/10LIovr.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/fe...

lone_haxx0r 7y ago

So, the US having freedom really was just a meme after all.

plazmatic 7y ago
Everything is a meme to the plebs these days. Simplify everything for the small brains.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
jrockway 7y ago
TLS is still legal. So is routing all your traffic through Tor if you think the metadata is relevant. I can't imagine much useful material comes from wiretapping these days. Maybe once in a while, but the real value largely exists in the application layer, which is obtained in a different way.
- crehn 7y ago
  When TLS is everywhere, what's the most reasonable way for law enforcement to surveil suspects?
  - parliament32 7y ago
    Bottom-up. The FBI sees that you're having a TLS conversation at X time with a server in Facebook's IP range, so they just go ask Facebook for what you were doing at that time. Foreign-hosted services seem like they'd be hard to crack, but it's extremely likely their data flows though Cloudflare, Amazon, GCE, or a similar US-based company.
Angostura 7y ago
Following the requirements of a judge is not necessarily antithetical to Freedom. Even in societies where freedom is values, conspiracy to murder (say) tends to be frowned upon.
- lone_haxx0r 7y ago
  But Cisco hasn't conspired to murder anyone.

Gaelan 7y ago

Doesn’t seem like a backdoor AFIACT—just support for handling a request from the government. (Distinction being that the ISP manually tells their equipment to intercept data instead of the government having technical access.)

deleted 7y ago
[deleted]

rayiner 7y ago

Lawful Intercept is not a backdoor: > The surveillance is performed through the use of wiretaps on traditional telecommunications and Internet services in voice, data, and multiservice networks. The LEA delivers a request for a wiretap to the target's service provider, who is responsible for intercepting data communication to and from the individual. The service provider uses the target's IP address or session to determine which of its edge routers handles the target's traffic (data communication). The service provider then intercepts the target's traffic as it passes through the router, and sends a copy of the intercepted traffic to the LEA without the target's knowledge. Responding to lawful warrants and subpoenas is everyone’s obligation, and has been for hundreds of years under American law, and English law before that. The government is entitled to almost any evidence—it just has to follow the proper process to get it. Lawful intercept just supports that process. That’s also why the FBI having access to US data is fundamentally different than Chinese back doors in US networks. US law enforcement has legal ways to access data flowing in networks to perform their legitimate law enforcement functions. The Chinese have no legitimate reason to access data in US networks.

windexh8er 7y ago
Lawful intercept isn't itself a backdoor, but it did provide one that was exposed via Snowden. In this case I'll call a spade a spade: many lawful intercept tools were used as backdoors, or overreach of legal authority. Again, keep in mind the context of my original comment: the years 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. The FBI may have stepped in with a heavy hand for many reasons but those reasons may have included inclusion of another large ISP in programs like PRISM.
- tptacek 7y ago
  PRISM was literally a system for handling the paperwork for lawful intercepts. There are instances of the USG exceeding its authority, but you've somehow managed to cite one of the few leaked programs that had an almost purely lawful purpose.
  - windexh8er 7y ago