5 ms·

By LE capable firmware you mean that the FBI had a backdoor to eavesdrop? Wow.

by yding 7y ago

windexh8er 7y ago
Yes indeed [0]. [0] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/feature/guides/lawful_intercept/10LIovr.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/fe...
- lone_haxx0r 7y ago
  So, the US having freedom really was just a meme after all.
  - plazmatic 7y ago
    Everything is a meme to the plebs these days. Simplify everything for the small brains.
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
  - jrockway 7y ago
    TLS is still legal. So is routing all your traffic through Tor if you think the metadata is relevant. I can't imagine much useful material comes from wiretapping these days. Maybe once in a while, but the real value largely exists in the application layer, which is obtained in a different way.
    - crehn 7y ago
      When TLS is everywhere, what's the most reasonable way for law enforcement to surveil suspects?
      - parliament32 7y ago
        Bottom-up. The FBI sees that you're having a TLS conversation at X time with a server in Facebook's IP range, so they just go ask Facebook for what you were doing at that time. Foreign-hosted services seem like they'd be hard to crack, but it's extremely likely their data flows though Cloudflare, Amazon, GCE, or a similar US-based company.
  - Angostura 7y ago
    Following the requirements of a judge is not necessarily antithetical to Freedom. Even in societies where freedom is values, conspiracy to murder (say) tends to be frowned upon.
    - lone_haxx0r 7y ago
      But Cisco hasn't conspired to murder anyone.
- Gaelan 7y ago
  Doesn’t seem like a backdoor AFIACT—just support for handling a request from the government. (Distinction being that the ISP manually tells their equipment to intercept data instead of the government having technical access.)
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
- rayiner 7y ago
  Lawful Intercept is not a backdoor: > The surveillance is performed through the use of wiretaps on traditional telecommunications and Internet services in voice, data, and multiservice networks. The LEA delivers a request for a wiretap to the target's service provider, who is responsible for intercepting data communication to and from the individual. The service provider uses the target's IP address or session to determine which of its edge routers handles the target's traffic (data communication). The service provider then intercepts the target's traffic as it passes through the router, and sends a copy of the intercepted traffic to the LEA without the target's knowledge. Responding to lawful warrants and subpoenas is everyone’s obligation, and has been for hundreds of years under American law, and English law before that. The government is entitled to almost any evidence—it just has to follow the proper process to get it. Lawful intercept just supports that process. That’s also why the FBI having access to US data is fundamentally different than Chinese back doors in US networks. US law enforcement has legal ways to access data flowing in networks to perform their legitimate law enforcement functions. The Chinese have no legitimate reason to access data in US networks.
  - windexh8er 7y ago
    Lawful intercept isn't itself a backdoor, but it did provide one that was exposed via Snowden. In this case I'll call a spade a spade: many lawful intercept tools were used as backdoors, or overreach of legal authority. Again, keep in mind the context of my original comment: the years 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. The FBI may have stepped in with a heavy hand for many reasons but those reasons may have included inclusion of another large ISP in programs like PRISM.
    - tptacek 7y ago
      PRISM was literally a system for handling the paperwork for lawful intercepts. There are instances of the USG exceeding its authority, but you've somehow managed to cite one of the few leaked programs that had an almost purely lawful purpose.
      - windexh8er 7y ago
dsl 7y ago
No, not at all. It was an extension of lawful wiretaps in to the digital age. CALEA required that manufacturers add the ability for lawful intercept to be done on their equipment by the providers that purchased them. Law enforcement still had to go to a judge, get a court order, and take it to the ISP. The ISP could then configure the devices to siphon off traffic from a single customer to a collection device. The same functionality and process has existed in phone networks basically since they became electronically switched.
- windexh8er 7y ago
  While your statement on CALEA is true it also isn't the correct history. What CALEA put in place was designed for lawful intercept but we also know there were programs in use going against said law [0]. Remember the context of my conversation was 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. It's likely state, local and national agencies have less of an interest, today, at route/switch infrastructure simply because of the post-Snowden crypto push. [0] https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mvp8ga/the-fbi-wants-to-wiretap-every-us-citizen-online https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mvp8ga/the-fbi-wants-to-w...
  - dsl 7y ago
    PRISM was a confusing program because neither the people reporting on it, or the tech companies impacted understood how it worked. The claim was the NSA had direct access in to providers networks, and the companies claimed they did not - the "logical" conclusion was an abuse of CALEA or similar access granted to FBI. It was later discovered the NSA capability was the direct result of tapping fiber optic cables between international data centers, nothing to do with lawful intercept capabilities.
    - windexh8er 7y ago
      We never got the full picture on PRISM. We do know that at least a part of the program was a direct result of tapping fiber much of the program also went redacted. I've posted this before but during 2010 the main data center I had access to was closed one evening and the next morning we had a mobile server rack tied back to main routing gear via fiber which was in a mobile rack, blacked out and fully tamper taped. We knew a three letter agency was installing it and all floor access was revoked for that evening as well as being in the building. This was not off long haul fiber but was off of main routing infrastructure. I don't believe PRISM was purely fiber taps and that these programs had deeper hooks. Unfortunately I don't have any evidence beyond the assumption based on the facts I had been given and what I physically saw. I've used and installed a lot of long haul gear and have seen and installed many fiber taps in my day, this implementation was hardly passive in nature. But, that's just first hand knowledge of a random patron of the Internet.
ahoka 7y ago
I can assure you that every telecom equipment has lawful interception capabilities. Some countries even mandate a standard log format for metadata (Turkey does that). It's just one of the features that the operators ask for when getting their equipment, because they have to comply with local law enforcement.

By LE capable firmware you mean that the FBI had a backdoor to eavesdrop? Wow.

by yding 7y ago

By LE capable firmware you mean that the FBI had a backdoor to eavesdrop? Wow.

Yes indeed [0]. [0] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/feature/guides/lawful_intercept/10LIovr.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/fe...

lone_haxx0r 7y ago
So, the US having freedom really was just a meme after all.
- plazmatic 7y ago
  Everything is a meme to the plebs these days. Simplify everything for the small brains.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
- jrockway 7y ago
  TLS is still legal. So is routing all your traffic through Tor if you think the metadata is relevant. I can't imagine much useful material comes from wiretapping these days. Maybe once in a while, but the real value largely exists in the application layer, which is obtained in a different way.
  - crehn 7y ago
    When TLS is everywhere, what's the most reasonable way for law enforcement to surveil suspects?
    - parliament32 7y ago
      Bottom-up. The FBI sees that you're having a TLS conversation at X time with a server in Facebook's IP range, so they just go ask Facebook for what you were doing at that time. Foreign-hosted services seem like they'd be hard to crack, but it's extremely likely their data flows though Cloudflare, Amazon, GCE, or a similar US-based company.
- Angostura 7y ago
  Following the requirements of a judge is not necessarily antithetical to Freedom. Even in societies where freedom is values, conspiracy to murder (say) tends to be frowned upon.
  - lone_haxx0r 7y ago
    But Cisco hasn't conspired to murder anyone.
Gaelan 7y ago
Doesn’t seem like a backdoor AFIACT—just support for handling a request from the government. (Distinction being that the ISP manually tells their equipment to intercept data instead of the government having technical access.)
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
rayiner 7y ago
Lawful Intercept is not a backdoor: > The surveillance is performed through the use of wiretaps on traditional telecommunications and Internet services in voice, data, and multiservice networks. The LEA delivers a request for a wiretap to the target's service provider, who is responsible for intercepting data communication to and from the individual. The service provider uses the target's IP address or session to determine which of its edge routers handles the target's traffic (data communication). The service provider then intercepts the target's traffic as it passes through the router, and sends a copy of the intercepted traffic to the LEA without the target's knowledge. Responding to lawful warrants and subpoenas is everyone’s obligation, and has been for hundreds of years under American law, and English law before that. The government is entitled to almost any evidence—it just has to follow the proper process to get it. Lawful intercept just supports that process. That’s also why the FBI having access to US data is fundamentally different than Chinese back doors in US networks. US law enforcement has legal ways to access data flowing in networks to perform their legitimate law enforcement functions. The Chinese have no legitimate reason to access data in US networks.
- windexh8er 7y ago
  Lawful intercept isn't itself a backdoor, but it did provide one that was exposed via Snowden. In this case I'll call a spade a spade: many lawful intercept tools were used as backdoors, or overreach of legal authority. Again, keep in mind the context of my original comment: the years 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. The FBI may have stepped in with a heavy hand for many reasons but those reasons may have included inclusion of another large ISP in programs like PRISM.
  - tptacek 7y ago
    PRISM was literally a system for handling the paperwork for lawful intercepts. There are instances of the USG exceeding its authority, but you've somehow managed to cite one of the few leaked programs that had an almost purely lawful purpose.
    - windexh8er 7y ago

dsl 7y ago

No, not at all. It was an extension of lawful wiretaps in to the digital age. CALEA required that manufacturers add the ability for lawful intercept to be done on their equipment by the providers that purchased them. Law enforcement still had to go to a judge, get a court order, and take it to the ISP. The ISP could then configure the devices to siphon off traffic from a single customer to a collection device. The same functionality and process has existed in phone networks basically since they became electronically switched.

windexh8er 7y ago
While your statement on CALEA is true it also isn't the correct history. What CALEA put in place was designed for lawful intercept but we also know there were programs in use going against said law [0]. Remember the context of my conversation was 2010-2011 which was pre-Snowden. It's likely state, local and national agencies have less of an interest, today, at route/switch infrastructure simply because of the post-Snowden crypto push. [0] https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mvp8ga/the-fbi-wants-to-wiretap-every-us-citizen-online https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mvp8ga/the-fbi-wants-to-w...
- dsl 7y ago
  PRISM was a confusing program because neither the people reporting on it, or the tech companies impacted understood how it worked. The claim was the NSA had direct access in to providers networks, and the companies claimed they did not - the "logical" conclusion was an abuse of CALEA or similar access granted to FBI. It was later discovered the NSA capability was the direct result of tapping fiber optic cables between international data centers, nothing to do with lawful intercept capabilities.
  - windexh8er 7y ago
    We never got the full picture on PRISM. We do know that at least a part of the program was a direct result of tapping fiber much of the program also went redacted. I've posted this before but during 2010 the main data center I had access to was closed one evening and the next morning we had a mobile server rack tied back to main routing gear via fiber which was in a mobile rack, blacked out and fully tamper taped. We knew a three letter agency was installing it and all floor access was revoked for that evening as well as being in the building. This was not off long haul fiber but was off of main routing infrastructure. I don't believe PRISM was purely fiber taps and that these programs had deeper hooks. Unfortunately I don't have any evidence beyond the assumption based on the facts I had been given and what I physically saw. I've used and installed a lot of long haul gear and have seen and installed many fiber taps in my day, this implementation was hardly passive in nature. But, that's just first hand knowledge of a random patron of the Internet.

ahoka 7y ago

I can assure you that every telecom equipment has lawful interception capabilities. Some countries even mandate a standard log format for metadata (Turkey does that). It's just one of the features that the operators ask for when getting their equipment, because they have to comply with local law enforcement.