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> One part of your talk is saying there is this range of metaphorical domains—dynamic systems, control systems, biological adaptation, resonance models—differen
by jmmcd 7y ago
> One part of your talk is saying there is this range of metaphorical domains—dynamic systems, control systems, biological adaptation, resonance models—different kinds of pictures, and of that panopoly, we’ve chosen the computational almost uniquely to pursue.
> If instead we analogize to forms like simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, neural networks and so forth
Perhaps I'm missing something, but I see all of these things as well within the boundaries of computation!
- eli_gottlieb 7y agoYes, computer scientists tend to! I'm always a little surprised when supposed robotics researchers and philosophers of mind insist that, for instance, control theory poses an alternative to talking about the nervous system performing computations. What do they think optimal control algorithms do?
- mannykannot 7y agoI would say computation provides models for these systems, but, in general, these systems are not themselves computations - some of them are not literally the manipulation of abstract symbols by formal rules. But, from a broader perspective, I don't think the "is this computation" question is a very useful one to pursue. Any true understanding of the conscious mind will have to answer the question of why it is different from the things we understand now: if it is, in fact, computation, then it is different in some way from the computations that we do understand now, and it is the differences that will be key to understanding it. When we understand it, we will have a informed basis for fitting it into our ontology.