4 ms·
> suppose an attacker is able to get unprivileged code to run on your machine (by taking over some process). He is now able to extract secrets from other proces
by acdha 8y ago
> suppose an attacker is able to get unprivileged code to run on your machine (by taking over some process). He is now able to extract secrets from other processes on the machine that he ordinarily wouldn't have access to. Think SSL keys etc.
I think that's the catch: it's the set of cases where someone can get code execution without being able to directly retrieve the targeted data, which is already pretty low, and where the best mitigation technique is to harden against these attacks rather than use a dedicated service (e.g. if you're using an HSM for crypto or have a dedicated SSL-offload box, you don't have to worry about keys being compromised when someone finds a bug in the much greater exposed surface area of your application).