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What are the possible pitfalls of _not_ runnning spectre et all mitigations, if you're _not_ hosting other people's code, but on your own hardware?
by exabrial 8y ago
What are the possible pitfalls of _not_ runnning spectre et all mitigations, if you're _not_ hosting other people's code, but on your own hardware?
- Filligree 8y agoNot much. We've yet to see any live Spectre exploits (that I know of), and I'd be surprised if the first one is a remote exploit.
- londons_explore 8y agoGood point... I wonder why? The proof of concept code works so well for some variants.
- kllrnohj 8y agoBecause most channels for delivering untrusted code have already been fixed. There's really only 2 channels for delivering code these days to attack consumers - app stores & web browsers. Web browsers had crude mitigations immediately (disable SharedArrayBuffer), and have improved since then (full site isolation https://v8.dev/blog/spectre https://v8.dev/blog/spectre ) As for app stores there's typically easier malware attack vectors if you manage to get an app installed & past the scanners in place with that typical back & forth escalation game. And those run in process-level sandboxes with clamped down syscalls. You can't exploit a spectre BPF attack if you can't use BPF at all due to selinux rules, for example. Moving past consumer what else are you really going to attack? Sure you could rent some virtual hosting somewhere and hope you get lucky attacking a neighboring VM, but what's really your end goal there to justify the time & risk? It's not like you can reliably pick a target with that, you just have to go fishing and react to what you may or may not find.
- Symmetry 8y agoI can see how a local Meltdown exploit would be useful but what would be the point of a local Spectre exploit?
- idrae 8y agoNot an expert, but if you are running absolutely no untrusted code (which is hard depending on your definition of untrusted), then the risks are low. However, when a vulnerability is found, then spectre etc. make it easier to abuse that vulnerability to do something useful.
- chmod775 8y agoJust guessing here, but suppose an attacker is able to get unprivileged code to run on your machine (by taking over some process). He is now able to extract secrets from other processes on the machine that he ordinarily wouldn't have access to. Think SSL keys etc. But I believe you're right in that those exploits are not as dangerous in a non-shared hosting scenario.
- zorked 8y agoQuick reminder that a browser with JavaScript is a way to run unprivileged code on your machine.
- phire 8y agoI'm not even sure code execution is strictly necessary for this style of attacks. An attacker could carefully craft network packets to force the control flow of existing software to manipulate the CPU state. They could and then use the timing differences in network packets to read data out. Would be painfully slow, but theoretically possible.
- bannable 8y agoI don't think this is correct. The timing attacks here all require extremely high resolution timers, and network + I/O latency would obscure the variance entirely.
- dymk 8y agoPeople are able to crack poor password comparison implementations over a jittery, latency heavy network. It’s possible to get almost arbitrarily high resolution when doing timing side channel attacks, you’ll just need many more samples.
- _hl_ 8y agoA while a go there was a post on here describing exactly that. I can't find it anymore unfortunately (maybe someone else has it?), but judging from my memory of that discussion this should be doable-ish. But if you're just running a local home system the chances of being targeted with such an unreliable attack are virtually zero.
- userbinator 8y agoNone, really. If you're not sharing your hardware with other code you don't trust, it's not a problem.
- mtgx 8y agoSo then we agree it's a problem. What code do you actually trust? (to be incorruptible/unhackable, etc)
- maccard 8y agoI think you're being overly pedantic and ultimately unhelpful and not contributing to the discussion. When I install software I am implicitly trusting it, whether that software is trustworthy or not. If it is exploitable that doesn't mean I didn't trust the software. On my personal computer, the expectation is that only the software I have implicitly trusted will be running. If I install something that isn't trustworthy but trust it anyway it's game over. If it's exploited, that's a different issue to trusting it. Shared VMs are a totally different ball game. All of a sudden I am sharing resources with a potentially bad actor.whethrt or not I trust them is kind of indifferent, I don't get to choose who I colocate with, and ultimately that's the difference.
- atq2119 8y agoSo you've disabled JavaScript, right?
- acdha 8y ago… or are running that JavaScript in Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, or Internet Explorer which all shipped updates last year. Being pedantic about this is not helping anyone actually be more secure: the odds are orders of magnitude greater that someone will be compromised by a different security problem than by the diminishing returns trying this attack against a current browser, and that the attacker will directly obtain the data they want without needing a side-channel attack.
- 8y ago
- Shivetya 8y agoAccording to Apple[1] Full mitigation requires using the Terminal app to enable an additional CPU instruction and disable hyper-threading processing technology. So, if you have a system which you cannot expose it is a pretty big damper on performance. [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210107 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210107
- etaioinshrdlu 8y agoAnd you also benefit from herd immunity. If 99.9% of people have mitigations, then the likelihood of your difficult timing attack working is quite low... so why bother trying?