5 ms·
The localizer (lateral deviation indication) is going to be harder to spoof due to the beat/squeal that it would introduce when broadcast alongside the legitima
by sokoloff 8y ago
The localizer (lateral deviation indication) is going to be harder to spoof due to the beat/squeal that it would introduce when broadcast alongside the legitimate localizer. The pilot (or PNF) will monitor the audio signal for the Morse code that identifies the localizer and the squeal will be apparent.
The glideslope signal (vertical deviation indication) would be easier to spoof. Set that up 1/2 mile short of the runway and aligned to intercept the proper glideslope shortly before the true glideslope intercept point (Maltese cross on the chart). That has a chance of working and going undetected. If you're able to get an aircraft onto the rogue glideslope lobe, even when ATC gets a low altitude alert, the crew is likely to report they're perfectly on glideslope. I'm not sure this is as practical an attack as simply firing on an aircraft on approach, of course.
- i_am_proteus 8y agoOne could probably simultaneously spoof ADS-B for added chaos.
- jcims 8y agoEasily. I've heard that some systems are using trilateration to reject spoofed ADS-B but am not sure how widespread that is. Trolling flightradar24 and like services would be easy.
- crankylinuxuser 8y agoThat's certainly an interesting approach, but also spoofed by sending a adsb-spammer on a balloon. Then, start flooding adsb with 10-100 messages a second. Wireless systems without AAA and encryption and signing are effectively fucked.
- AWildC182 8y agoAnd with WAAS, the world is moving towards GPS approaches anyway. Even without careful planning anyone with a mildly powerful VHF radio and a yagi antenna can jam ILS, VORs and ATC comms rather effectively and has been able to since the end of WWII. I've seen these articles pop up a few times in the past couple days but everyone in aviation already knows that there isn't any security on this stuff. People even jam ATC for giggles sometimes[1]. There's enough redundancy that nothing bad has happened as a result so everyone goes on with life. I think this is just low hanging defcon fruit targeting non aviation-aware readers. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvA_-linhg8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvA_-linhg8
- monocasa 8y agoCan't you override GPS too? I thought that was part of the exploit chain that netted Iran a stealth drone.
- AWildC182 8y agoThe Iran thing is dubious. If they did pull it off it required state level resources. Eventually it might be possible with commercial hardware but there isn't a lot of cheap stuff on the market that can generate the frequencies needed at the requisite power. It's worth noting that while the real GPS signal is very weak, the antennas that receive it are on the top of the plane and are somewhat directional. The receivers also have some minimal integrity checking capability IIRC. This is not to say it's impossible, but with the current stuff on the market and required software investment I'd put it at an order of magnitude or two higher execution complexity than grabbing a VHF radio and messing with ILS beams.
- toomuchtodo 8y ago> The Iran thing is dubious. If they did pull it off it required state level resources. https://www.cnet.com/news/truck-driver-has-gps-jammer-accidentally-jams-newark-airport/ https://www.cnet.com/news/truck-driver-has-gps-jammer-accide... (Truck driver has GPS jammer, accidentally jams Newark airport)
- crankylinuxuser 8y agoI've already taken over GPS (not jam, emulate all 12 sattelites for a takeover) in a dummy load environment (large paint can grounded). It was with a ADALM-Pluto. Tx was only 5mW but I could easily build a multistage amplifier and filtered appropriately. Why dont I? Its illegal and its ethically wrong, and its not my focus of study.
- londons_explore 8y agoI concur. Generating the requisite signal is easy to do with opensource code and just $200 or so of equipment. I bet the drone didn't use the military encrypted GPS because they didn't want encryption keys to fall into the wrong hands (they're global), or just because the effort to load the new GPS keys every week was too much, The attackers just jammed and then spoofed GPS, and by providing a very strong signal, any kalman filters designed to merge signals from inertial units would be fooled.
- jcims 8y agoCouldn't squeal be minimized by phase matching the localizer then mixing in a doppler offset (assuming you know what you're targeting)? You would still likely get some noise but possibly not sufficient to disrupt the action.
- Datenstrom 8y ago> harder to spoof Whenever I hear something like this it reminds me of the favorite talks I attended. The Iridium hacking talk at HOPE XI[1]. "When they talk about security they mainly talk about 'hey this is so complex, no one is able to do this, maybe a state or something like that'. So they say 'it will probably be beyond the reach of all but the most determined attackers.' We went well ok, we are determined." [1]: https://youtu.be/cvKaC4pNvck https://youtu.be/cvKaC4pNvck
- cco 8y agoAdditionally don't forget to add in the human aspect of this, the attack may be detectible to somebody in a clean room that is expecting it, but the same attack on a real pilot in flight may work because the human is not expecting it, is distracted, a little tired, paying attention to adverse weather etc
- madMapper 8y agoIsn't this pretty much the plot to Die Hard 2?
- wyldfire 8y ago> I'm not sure this is as practical an attack as simply firing on an aircraft on approach, of course. But that would reveal your position. Presumably the above could be executed without even being present: just leave behind the equipment.
- Stevvo 8y agoI don't think the attack would work in the wild; even on a Cat III autoland approach, there is still a decision altitude and runway visual range requirements. When the runway never appears it's a go around.
- stouset 8y agoCat IIIc has no decision height, but there aren’t any airports that are even planning to install this type of system that I’m aware of. Cat IIIa and IIIb have decision heights of 100ft and 50ft, respectively. Those don’t leave much time for a pilot to execute a go-around. You’d probably have to engineer the flight path to go through a building, power line, or other obstacle, but that in and of itself seems like a difficult proposition since flight paths leading into an airport with this type of system wouldn’t have 100ft obstacles anywhere near the approach direction. You’d have to spoof the localizer to be offset to the side of the runway to accomplish this, but doing it too far will cause instruments to disagree (GPS, VOR) and ATC to yell at you. Maybe you could aim it at a nearby taxiway, but to do so (per my understanding of the physics of ILS) you’d have to have your equipment in-line with the taxiway. All of this just seems really hard to pull off in practice.
- TheOtherHobbes 8y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Polish_Air_Force_Tu-154_crash https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Polish_Air_Force_Tu-154_c... One of the many conspiracy theories associated with this incident is that Russia deliberately created the physical and electronic conditions necessary for this crash to take place. The cockpit records suggest there were more obvious causes in this instance, but it seems very likely a state actor would be able to engineer a successful attack using a variety of means - not just ILS, but other forms of physical and electronic spoofing.
- sokoloff 8y agoIf you can get the airplane to descend early to a decision height 200 feet above touchdown zone elevation in an area where local terrain is 150’ above TDZE, you might be able to crash one who initiates the missed approach at the DH. I agree it’s not a practical attack.