According to the researchers in the paper[0] this is not true. >We have verified that we can leak information across arbitrary address spaces and privilege bou

According to the researchers in the paper[0] this is not true. >We have verified that we can leak information across arbitrary address spaces and privilege boundaries, even on recent Intel systems with the latest microcode updates and latest Linux kernel with all the Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF default mitigations up (KPTI, PTE inversion, etc.). In particular, the exploits we discuss below exemplify leaks in all the relevant cases of interest: process-to-process, kernel-to-userspace, guest-to-guest, and SGX-enclave-touserspace leaks. Not to mention that such attacks can be built even from a sandboxed environment such as JavaScript in the browser, where the attacker has limited capabilities compared to a native environment. [0] https://mdsattacks.com/files/ridl.pdf https://mdsattacks.com/files/ridl.pdf