Long ago? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts... (also htt

Long ago? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts... (also https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04718a000800290072-5 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-0...) But assuming a typewriter has no attack vectors is just as foolish as insecure networks IMO. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-soviets-used-ibm-selectric-keyloggers-to-spy-on-us-diplomats/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-s... Also: detecting text through keystrokes previously discussed here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 (https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acoustic_Emanations_Revisited/tiss.preprint.pdf https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acou...) Heck while I can't find a quick source, I remember a story about how the CIA designs rooms/walls and buildings to prevent sound from predictably bouncing through rooms in ways that could be captured from afar. Spooks are usually 10 steps ahead of the public common sense this sense.