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We don't need to revert to typewriters. We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind, instead of piles of ah-hoc mitigations. However, I b
by gambler 7y ago
We don't need to revert to typewriters. We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind, instead of piles of ah-hoc mitigations. However, I bet no one will invest in it until one of these exploits bring down AWS, take over Google's crawlers or something else of that sort.
- nickpsecurity 7y agoThere's smaller companies that keeps designing them. Nobody buys them for the most part. One example that can handle lots of security policies is CoreGuard. It's based on work at crash-safe.org. https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ Academics keep coming up with stuff for timing channels like partitioning, masking, and randomizing components. Personally, if not physical separation, I'd just do SMP with secret parts on different CPU that untrusted parts. Both memory safe on a separation kernel to isolate them. One design used different DIMM's, too.
- icelancer 7y ago>> We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind These are already options, as another commenter pointed out. If you need this kind of protection, it is available, at significant cost.