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At what point do we simply revert to using typewriters for authoring sensitive documents, and pneumatic tubes (couriers for WAN) for networking? https://www.th

At what point do we simply revert to using typewriters for authoring sensitive documents, and pneumatic tubes (couriers for WAN) for networking? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/germany-typewriters-espionage-nsa-spying-surveillance https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/germany-typewr...

gambler 7y ago
We don't need to revert to typewriters. We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind, instead of piles of ah-hoc mitigations. However, I bet no one will invest in it until one of these exploits bring down AWS, take over Google's crawlers or something else of that sort.
- nickpsecurity 7y ago
  There's smaller companies that keeps designing them. Nobody buys them for the most part. One example that can handle lots of security policies is CoreGuard. It's based on work at crash-safe.org. https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ Academics keep coming up with stuff for timing channels like partitioning, masking, and randomizing components. Personally, if not physical separation, I'd just do SMP with secret parts on different CPU that untrusted parts. Both memory safe on a separation kernel to isolate them. One design used different DIMM's, too.
- icelancer 7y ago
  >> We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind These are already options, as another commenter pointed out. If you need this kind of protection, it is available, at significant cost.
criley2 7y ago
Long ago? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts... (also https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04718a000800290072-5 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-0...) But assuming a typewriter has no attack vectors is just as foolish as insecure networks IMO. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-soviets-used-ibm-selectric-keyloggers-to-spy-on-us-diplomats/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-s... Also: detecting text through keystrokes previously discussed here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 (https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acoustic_Emanations_Revisited/tiss.preprint.pdf https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acou...) Heck while I can't find a quick source, I remember a story about how the CIA designs rooms/walls and buildings to prevent sound from predictably bouncing through rooms in ways that could be captured from afar. Spooks are usually 10 steps ahead of the public common sense this sense.
- nickpsecurity 7y ago
  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Information_Facility https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Info...

gambler 7y ago

We don't need to revert to typewriters. We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind, instead of piles of ah-hoc mitigations. However, I bet no one will invest in it until one of these exploits bring down AWS, take over Google's crawlers or something else of that sort.

nickpsecurity 7y ago
There's smaller companies that keeps designing them. Nobody buys them for the most part. One example that can handle lots of security policies is CoreGuard. It's based on work at crash-safe.org. https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ https://www.dovermicrosystems.com/ Academics keep coming up with stuff for timing channels like partitioning, masking, and randomizing components. Personally, if not physical separation, I'd just do SMP with secret parts on different CPU that untrusted parts. Both memory safe on a separation kernel to isolate them. One design used different DIMM's, too.
icelancer 7y ago
>> We just need computers designed with a real security model in mind These are already options, as another commenter pointed out. If you need this kind of protection, it is available, at significant cost.

criley2 7y ago

Long ago? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts... (also https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04718a000800290072-5 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-0...) But assuming a typewriter has no attack vectors is just as foolish as insecure networks IMO. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-soviets-used-ibm-selectric-keyloggers-to-spy-on-us-diplomats/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/how-s... Also: detecting text through keystrokes previously discussed here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7448976 (https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acoustic_Emanations_Revisited/tiss.preprint.pdf https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acou...) Heck while I can't find a quick source, I remember a story about how the CIA designs rooms/walls and buildings to prevent sound from predictably bouncing through rooms in ways that could be captured from afar. Spooks are usually 10 steps ahead of the public common sense this sense.

nickpsecurity 7y ago
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Information_Facility https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Info...