As a software developer (not a pilot), I think this misses the mark. Airbus has succeed in commercial fly-by-wire because their system provides protection over

As a software developer (not a pilot), I think this misses the mark. Airbus has succeed in commercial fly-by-wire because their system provides protection over the full flight envelope of the airplane (the specs it can withstand without crashing) and also lets the pilots back off on that automation when they need to. The Boeing MCAS solution isn't full flight envelope protection. As a family member of an Ethiopian crash victim put it, "Why does the software intervene to push the nose down if it thinks it's stalling but not to push the nose up if it's going to hit the ground?" This is a case of failure to properly certify mission-critical software and it reminds me of Toyota's unintended acceleration problems with the Prius, where the company was found in court to have willfully ignored standard protocols in testing mission-critical apps.