> There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots. At the time of the crash, it appears that the establis

> There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots. At the time of the crash, it appears that the established procedures were insufficient. In particular, the MCAS failure creates a qualitatively different 'runaway stabilizer' than the previously-imagined failure mode of a stuck-on motor. In turn, that seems to have created a situation where the pilots did accurately follow the runaway stabilizer checklist, but the trim was so far off neutral that they could not manually control it. That's why the article here notes that the older-spec second switch, which deactivated just autopilot inputs into the electric trim system, could have helped. However, that is still far from a final answer, since the troubleshooting checklist would still need modification to try deactivating just auto-trim rather than both switches.