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If the NSA responded, is there a response which could both command respect, and be truthful? it feels like the only one would be to acknowledge this team found
by ggm 8y ago
If the NSA responded, is there a response which could both command respect, and be truthful? it feels like the only one would be to acknowledge this team found a flaw. The secondary questions would be to ask if the flaw was inserted, or happenstance (which implies the NSA is incompetent at maths, distinct from politics: we already know they blotted their copybook politically)
- wwwigham 8y agoThe construction is at least at face value a pretty simple ARX cipher - the only real questions being why choose the specific rotation constants they do for each round (ciphers developed in the open usually do things like key off digits of pi) and why compose specifically via xor, then add, then rotate in each round, rather than more of a blend. If this style algorithm does indeed have an intentional backdoor: That's some crazy mathematic chops and I'd love to read the theory behind how it (the intentionally weak algorithm) was found (since hopefully that leads to a natural way to generate stronger algorithms, or at least check for weak ones). That'd be a valuable takeaway for the security community once the secret's spoiled, if it is the case.
- cyphar 8y ago> ciphers developed in the open usually do things like key off digits of pi It should be noted that we should be very wary of these types of "nothing up my sleeve" numbers. djb showed[1] that with enough effort you could come up with more than a million "obviously not backdoored" numbers (this was done in the context of elliptic curves) -- enough to exploit a million-to-one unknown-by-the-public vulnerability. [1]: https://youtu.be/Cj3PN5-n108 https://youtu.be/Cj3PN5-n108
- throwawaymath 8y agoThe context Bernstein is talking about is very meaningful here. The mathematics of public-key cryptography provides a rich tapestry for covering up hidden backdoors. ARX ciphers are very simple compared to elliptic curves, and the complexity of round constants isn't really comparable to that of curves.
- cyphar 8y agoRight, I should've added I agree with GP that ARX ciphers are incredibly simple and the ability to backdoor them would be a very novel (and concerning) discovery. My point is that "the values come from pi" is not necessarily proof that the constants really are "nothing up my sleeve". Bernstein was discussing this in the context of NIST curves (which could be backdoored), but the same one-in-a-million maths works for any constants (so long as you happen to know a weak-constants vulnerability that isn't known by the public).
- blattimwind 8y ago> command respect That's not how you want to conduct cryptography as a science.
- ggm 8y agoWell no. But it is how you want to conduct public oversight of agencies which claim to operate on your behalf: you want to be able to believe them. But in crypto, it pays to believe nothing and check everything, which implies competent people able to check outside the walls. Which I guess, is what is happening, but I would be interested in the NSA response since they are after all, a public agency.
- throwawaymath 8y ago> which implies the NSA is incompetent at maths No, it doesn't. EDIT: To whoever downvoted - developing cryptography is hard. The idea that developing one broken cipher implies mathematical incompetence is laughable. You can't draw any conclusion from it except that it's hard to develop ciphers which aren't broken.
- ggm 8y agoI didn't downvote. It was a flippant comment and I am sure they are highly competent. Its just more normal for the algo selection process to winnow out the ones with simple holes, and the authors of this paper say their technique was both simple and fast, which I would have expected to be found sooner.