3 ms·
How can you tel an app has actually been signed in the past? It could just as well been signed today with a fake date. This defeats the purpose of expiry. You
by tinus_hn 8y ago
How can you tel an app has actually been signed in the past? It could just as well been signed today with a fake date. This defeats the purpose of expiry.
You could just as well have certificates that never expire and just start signing with a new one if you feel like it.
Note the Mozilla ‘solution’ has the same problem: their root now authorized a new certificate with the old public key. If the original expectation was that the private key would be safe for a certain number of years (which is why you have expiry dates in the first place) the unsafe private key is now valid again. This defeats the purpose of expiry.
- michaelt 8y agoIt could just as well been signed today with a fake date. The traditional option (used by things like Java and ActiveX since the early 2000s) is Trusted Timestamping [1], where a trusted third party provides a signature (such as via RFC 3161 Time Stamp Protocol). AFAIK every certificate authority that sells code-signing certificates also provides a free timestamping server. If you trust a CA to issue code-signing certificates, the theory is you'd trust them to timestamp too. If you don't like having the trusted third party, you can also publish the hash in some write-once medium, such as on the blockchain, in certificate transparency logs, or in the small ads of a reputable newspaper. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_timestamping https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_timestamping
- tinus_hn 8y agoYou don’t trust an authority, you trust a private key that matches a public key you know. The point is that as time marches on the key might leak or be cracked and then your trust is misplaced. So you say the key pair expires and you stop trusting it before that happens. This trusted timestamping relies on the same signing things with public and private keys process so it just adds a step, it doesn’t solve the problem. The timestamping key needs to expire as well and then it can’t be trusted anymore.
- michaelt 8y agoPlenty of the CA root certificates in my browser's trust store have 30 year validity periods. The "keys should have short expiry periods" rule doesn't appear to apply to CAs. Admittedly, CAs are held to higher standards than most certificate users in terms of keeping keys in hardware security modules and suchlike. So perhaps it's not 100% unjustified that they get longer validity periods.
- flohofwoe 8y agoThe code-signing needs to happen through a trusted / certified timestamp server, it's not using the local timestamp. This process basically guarantees that the application used a valid certificate at the time it was signed, and that it wasn't tampered with since then. With this, the time when code-signed application is executed doesn't matter at all, fake date or not.