4 ms·
The post seems to imply that it was a simple overlook (which is frequent when every such thing is not formally tracked). I agree that it is hard. > We’ll be ru
by lifthrasiir 8y ago
The post seems to imply that it was a simple overlook (which is frequent when every such thing is not formally tracked). I agree that it is hard.
> We’ll be running a formal post-mortem next week and will publish the list of changes we intend to make, but in the meantime here are my initial thoughts about what we need to do. First, we should have a much better way of tracking the status of everything in Firefox that is a potential time bomb and making sure that we don’t find ourselves in a situation where one goes off unexpectedly. We’re still working out the details here, but at minimum we need to inventory everything of this nature.
- ekianjo 8y ago> a simple overlook I'm sorry but when your business is to enable 30 000 extensions to work your business is also to check that certificates that enable such extensions don't fail tomorrow. That's the core of one's job, not even a side project or something.
- lifthrasiir 8y agoI don't claim to know what actually happened, but one possible cause is that the HSM (required for issuing and renewing intermediate certificates, mentioned in the post) might require a right person and right schedule to operate. The use of an HSM means that you don't normally use it to issue certificates and you should only touch it a few times a year. As a result there may have been only a few people with an effective knowledge of the HSM; when they can't be scheduled for some various reasons, well, it may be forgotten. While it of course sucks, something like this happens anywhere anytime.