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They're already a CA, could they reasonably just issue a certificate for every bucket? I have no idea how many buckets there are in total. ~They probably could
by regecks 7y ago
They're already a CA, could they reasonably just issue a certificate for every bucket? I have no idea how many buckets there are in total.
~They probably couldn't take the Cloudflare approach of jamming 100 customer domains onto each certificate, since that would leak bucket names too easily.~
- mmastrac 7y agoIsn't it technically valid to issue a cert with (star).domain.com, (star).(star).domain.com, (star).(star).(star).domain.com, etc...?
- judge2020 7y agoYou can technically create them, but IIRC browsers don't trust them.
- oasisbob 7y agoAnd creating/signing them is a violation of the CAB Forum Baseline requirements.
- koolba 7y agoNo you can only have a single wildcard per domain listed in a cert.
- deathanatos 7y agoAnd only as the leftmost component, that is, (star).example.com is valid, foo.(star).example.com is not.
- philip1209 7y agoThey could probably even generate them in a lazy-loading style
- blattimwind 7y agoGiven that the certificates don't really need unique keys this would actually be feasible, yes (since then generating the cert only requires a RSA signature).
- RKearney 7y ago> They probably couldn't take the Cloudflare approach of jamming 100 customer domains onto each certificate, since that would leak bucket names too easily. Issuing one certificate at a time wouldn't make a difference since they're all submitted to public CT logs. Bucket names shouldn't contain sensitive information and security through obscurity is a bad idea.
- regecks 7y agoYeah, good point. It makes me doubt that they will issue bucket-specific certificates at all. Perpetually exposing every single bucket name seems like a bad trade-off just to satisfy certificate verification. Maybe there will be a name translation scheme for bucket names with periods (kinda like punycode for IDNs).
- mjevans 7y agoWith an Internet that doesn't push back packet rejection to bad hosts, rather than victims that are being flooded; being able to individually address buckets sounds like an increased risk.
- falsedan 7y ago> security through obscurity is a bad idea only if that's your only defense, which it was for a lot of old crypto schemes & why the crypto community consensus was to publish algorithms/assume the attacker had the implementation. that mindset isn't universally applicable
- blattimwind 7y ago> security through obscurity is a bad idea Obscurity is a good and sensible layer for defense in depth. Systems A and A' were the only difference for A' is added obscurity will result in A' being more difficult to attack.
- judge2020 7y agoA change like this would already end up exposing every bucket name - at least if you wanted them to actually work in browsers. CT logs are required for all browsers now (subject to https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/docs/certificate-transparency.md https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/... ).
- clinta 7y agoThere is progress being made on allowing redaction of subdomains in CT logs. https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-strad-trans-redaction-01.html https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-strad-trans-redaction-01.htm...
- morpheuskafka 7y agoIt would probably be easier to work with customers who can't migrate to make a wildcard for their use-case, e.g. for xyz.evilcorp bucket names, you could just make one *.evilcorp.s3.amazonaws.com cert.