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My point is that the quantity of activity I am talking about will far exceed our ability to analyse and/or control it. Hell, that's already happened; if you don

My point is that the quantity of activity I am talking about will far exceed our ability to analyse and/or control it. Hell, that's already happened; if you don't believe me, I've got a record industry I'd like to sell you. Take your own phase, "pinpoint the origin of disturbances." What exactly is meant by that? There are literally thousands of people all over the world who loaded up LOIC and are participating in this attack. I myself contributed simply by surfing to Mastercard.com to see what all the fuss was about, as I'm sure millions of others did as well. Who is culpable? Assuming it were technically possible, how would you go about solving this problem? I hope you'll agree that the word "pinpoint" is hopelessly inadequate here. Anyways, the entire analogy is flawed. Policing that internet is absolutely nothing like patrolling the highways. How do you account for encryption? The fact that physical presence has no bearing on your online activities? This is unlike anything we've experienced before, and I have a hard time seeing free and democratic societies putting the genie back in the bottle. China is another story.

roel_v 16y ago
LOL, I'm reading this while watching the news here in the Netherlands with a clip on searches by the police at a Dutch hosting company that was hosting a website that called for the DDoS on MasterCard. The legal system is already catching up. The question is not how to control, within hours, an attack like the one that happened on MasterCard. The matter is that when it happens again, and there is enough momentum for it, everybody participating will be logged (I mean it's generally not that hard to distinguish between a regular visitor and someone running LOIC) and prosecuted. After a while it will become known that doing things like this has consequences, and the amount of people willing to participate will fall rapidly, until there is only a core left (this core is usually hard to control, but small enough to not matter much). Take another analogy: rioters. What is the strategy when you have a group of rioting protesters? You contains the damage (police squads to keep the mob from strategic points) and you arrest a few of the core people and prosecute them. That doesn't stop rioters, but it does impose a barrier on participation; so the size of the group of people willing to riot is small enough to be restricted to some extremists (which, despite popular opinion, is quite small).

roel_v 16y ago

LOL, I'm reading this while watching the news here in the Netherlands with a clip on searches by the police at a Dutch hosting company that was hosting a website that called for the DDoS on MasterCard. The legal system is already catching up. The question is not how to control, within hours, an attack like the one that happened on MasterCard. The matter is that when it happens again, and there is enough momentum for it, everybody participating will be logged (I mean it's generally not that hard to distinguish between a regular visitor and someone running LOIC) and prosecuted. After a while it will become known that doing things like this has consequences, and the amount of people willing to participate will fall rapidly, until there is only a core left (this core is usually hard to control, but small enough to not matter much). Take another analogy: rioters. What is the strategy when you have a group of rioting protesters? You contains the damage (police squads to keep the mob from strategic points) and you arrest a few of the core people and prosecute them. That doesn't stop rioters, but it does impose a barrier on participation; so the size of the group of people willing to riot is small enough to be restricted to some extremists (which, despite popular opinion, is quite small).