2 ms·
> If the attacker managed to read the inner state of your RNG, you need to rotate all keys. That's not the attack I'm talking about. The inner-state of your RN
by dragontamer 8y ago
> If the attacker managed to read the inner state of your RNG, you need to rotate all keys.
That's not the attack I'm talking about. The inner-state of your RNG can be brute-forced with an attack of size 2^256 (assuming 256-bits of internal state to your RNG).
If your 256-bit RNG creates 100x 256-bit AES-keys, the "common thread" is to attack the RNG. That's the most efficient way to get all 100x AES keys.
Case in point:
1. Try state X
2. Did it generate the RNG Sequence you're attacking? If so, you're done.
3. If not, X = X+1. Go back to step #1 and loop.
Simple brute-force attack against the state. That is to say, a 256-bit RNG only has "256-bits" of protection. Or to put it another way: the 100x AES Keys you've generated all have 256-bits of protection, max.
-----------
Stick a TRUE Hardware random number generator with entropy guarantees (such as RDSEED) as your generator, and you're immune to this brute force attack. In theory, its a non-trivial difference. In practice, 256-bits of entropy is enough for most people, and no one is going to accomplish this brute force attack.
Its not about "draining" entropy. Its about asking yourself how much entropy your application needs. I can IMAGINE people needing more than 256-bits of entropy in higher-security contexts.
- wolf550e 8y agoWhat? No, brute forcing 2^256 is not an option. We assume brute forcing 2^128 is not an option. If brute forcing 2^256 were an option, why would anyone use AES-256?
- dragontamer 8y agoNo. Its not an option in practice. But its the starting point for a research problem. * 100x different AES-256 keys generated by /dev/random would have 25,600 bits of entropy. (All 100x keys are independent, and would require an attack effort per key). * 100x different AES-256 keys generated by /dev/urandom would "only" have 256-bits of entropy. (/dev/urandom would be attacked, assuming /dev/urandom started with 256-bits of entropy in its pool, assuming /dev/urandom never got extra entropy in the 100x calls) You can't pretend that the two solutions to the problem are the same. At best, you can suggest that 256-bits of entropy is enough for practical purposes.
- wolf550e 8y agoNo, brute forcing 2^256 is not the starting point of anything. Again, after seeding with initial entropy, /dev/random and /dev/urandom are the same, /dev/random is not better entropy. Attacking a single 256 bit key is exactly as equally impossible as attacking a 256 bit RNG pool used to generate 100 keys. There is no actual scenario in which using hardware RNG to generate 100 keys would keep me safe while using a hardware RNG to initialize a deterministic RNG to generate 100 keys would lead to compromise. If your attacker model includes brute forcing 2^256, I can't help you. If you're trying to prove that Aleph-one is greater than Aleph-0, perhaps, but the number of atoms in the universe is less than Aleph-0, so it's irrelevant to cryptography or to information security. People who say "maybe an advance in math will break 2048 bit DHE" are at least theoretically correct. But no advance in math is going to break that RNG. If you can't trust that RNG, you can't send secrets using CTR, GCM, CHACHA, etc. because they will all break using that method.
- dragontamer 8y ago> Attacking a single 256 bit key is exactly as equally impossible as attacking a 256 bit RNG pool used to generate 100 keys. But both are strictly easier than attacking 100x independently created 256-bit keys. The /dev/random case. > If you're trying to prove that Aleph-one is greater than Aleph-0 I mean, yeah, that's basically the argument I have. 256-bits of entropy are probably enough for your application, but you cannot under any circumstances tell me that its the same as 25,600 bits of entropy. That's what /dev/random vs /dev/urandom comes down to. For most people in most situations, its almost inconceivable to imagine an application that needs more than 256-bits of true high quality entropy. EDIT: A POTENTIAL case, which I admit I haven't though too much about... is a 2048-bit RSA key. I assume the RSA key needs to be generated with 2048-bits of true entropy (please correct me if I'm wrong), but the bits-of-security are far less than that, because RSA doesn't scale like other encryption schemes. So your 2048-bits of entropy RSA-key only scales to 128-bits of security. If your 2048-bits of entropy RSA-key ended up to only have 256-bits of entropy generating it, you're possibly in bad luck (only 16-bits of entropy assuming a similar scaling factor). I'm not a specialist in the math, but... not all cryptographic primitives scale 1-to-1 with the input entropy source.