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I don't believe that "we can’t get ought from is". This is because there is a connection between what is and the 'ought' actor (namely humans and the laws of th
by mgamache 7y ago
I don't believe that "we can’t get ought from is". This is because there is a connection between what is and the 'ought' actor (namely humans and the laws of the universe). That connection and the most basic reality of being human are enough to get a sense of ought from is. I know this goes against traditional philosophical thought. If you mean some type of ought that would be true after humans are extinct then sure, but it's almost a non-sense question (morality in the absence or human existence). Of course, no one acts as if we can't get ought from is (even if they disagree about the ought in many specific instances).
- UnFleshedOne 7y agoExactly, human desires, morals and all other sources of 'ought' are ultimately influenced by the way humans 'are'. So if you took in account whole evolutionary history, the way it influenced culture, the way culture developed itself based on that and other external influences (all 'is' questions), you would eventually arrive at human moral framework and that would let you generate 'ought' statements. Basically what we as humans do every day.
- perfmode 7y agoHow do you know one would eventually?
- UnFleshedOne 7y agoGood question. There is no reason to think otherwise at the moment and research in physics, biology, neuroscience, psychology and sociology kinda points that way? And I know that as well as I know anything I'm not an expert in -- from my own cursory review and stated opinions of people who are experts (again, as far as I know). In other words, it would be surprising otherwise? Our morals/desires depend on the way we are built and they dictate the 'oughts', thus providing a link from 'is'. And of course it is possible that we can never have enough information to decompile our own values because it is lost in compression, so we'll be stuck with dealing with a black box. But this is a technical limitation, not a philosophical one, and for a simpler system (for example a AGI if one can be built understandably) we would be able to derive its 'oughts' from what it 'is'.
- perfmode 7y agoYour prediction without proof is about as bankable as a prediction without proof of P == NP or P != NP. Just because something is intuitive doesn’t make it true.
- CM30 7y agoSo if psychopaths were 100% of the population, and empathy didn't exist at all, would that make most morals null and void? I think most would agree that a useful moral code shouldn't entirely be relativistic, and that an entire society can be in the wrong even if everyone in it considers their actions just.
- UnFleshedOne 7y agoA species of sentient hermit crabs would have entirely different moral intuitions from a species of sentient apes. Take this [0] as fictional evidence. :) Empathy doesn't have much to do with morals, it is closer to a mechanism of knowing what the other entity feels. This is useful in antagonistic scenarios as well as in cooperative ones. What you use it for is entirely up to you (and your built-in morals). I agree that entire society can be wrong, even if all other societies of a given species share that opinion at the time. Where relativism would come in is where there is a major difference in mind architecture. [0] - https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HawFh7RvDM4RyoJ2d/three-worlds-collide-0-8 https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HawFh7RvDM4RyoJ2d/three-worl...
- TomMckenny 7y agoExactly so: most existent people (myself included) would still insist the current "oughts" still apply in a universe of psychopaths. The question is why. Given that we can not directly observe or measure ought-ness, there must be some psychological feature that evolved to created the idea in us. Further more, that feature is critically necessary for us, often more than life itself. We also know it breaks down in hypotheticals. In that example about a world of psychopaths, most would agree right and wrong remain constant. But a different hypothetical, where god and sacred texts say the exact opposite of what they do, we would not see as many people saying their god would now be wrong. Furthermore, we do know somethings about "ought" like that it is not entirely relative, remains constant across world changes and, is vital to pursue. But we don't know were it comes from and why it varies slightly among cultures. So while we know right from wrong and that such distinctions are vital, we don't know how we know this. It might be that what I am describing is not quite what is meant by "ought". But there are other vital "self evident" concepts that needed adjustment to their definitions yet those adjustments neither destroy the entire concept nor even make any practical difference. Time, for example, is not quite what people intuit and heat seems self evidently entirely different than light yet is not. Yet those facts make no difference in every day life. I expect a better understanding of the origin of ethics will follow that pattern.
- leetcrew 7y ago> That connection and the most basic reality of being human are enough to get a sense of ought from is. but how? I think you might not appreciate how vexing the is/ought question is. murder is something that almost everyone agrees is wrong. most people couldn't exactly articulate why they think this, but I suspect the reason is that obviously causes ripples of pain, distress, and instability through a community. we may even be biologically conditioned against murdering our own kind. so clearly, if one wants to remain part of society, not cause unnecessary harm, and not experience guilt, one ought not commit the act of murder. but this is still not a universal moral claim; it depends on the desires of the agent. you are conflating practicality with the philosophical notion of truth. these philosophers are not interested in "a sense of ought"; they are looking for a rigorous method of constructing "ought" from what "is". that is the problem.
- YjSe2GMQ 7y ago> but how? I think it's quite simple - subjective experience. Under the assumption that others experience things (much like you do) you can just ask or infer what would they prefer, and what would cause pain. You can be wrong about what would they prefer (and they can be wrong), but it doesn't mean there's no coherent morality hiding under such mistakes. And I don't think that it's much to assume. I think it's no more that the general assumption that "causes have effects", or that there are any invariants we can attribute to the universe (like laws of physics). Note that this notion of morality extends beyond humans - for example to animals and potentially AI systems.
- leetcrew 7y agoI don't want to cause the subjective experience of pain, and I assume you don't want to either. the fact that we want to avoid pain, even the fact that (possibly) we have evolved to want to avoid harming fellow humans (and possibly other sentient beings) is a statement of what "is". unless you are willing to reduce morality to mere pragmatism, it is not at all clear how you get to an "ought" from these facts. I'm not saying this is some huge conundrum that we need to solve before we decide to go get breakfast without killing everyone we see along the way, but the problem as stated is a hard one.