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I am flummoxed as to how anyone would consider any kind of verbal communications during a cycling race to be "cheating". There are no rules governing informal

I am flummoxed as to how anyone would consider any kind of verbal communications during a cycling race to be "cheating". There are no rules governing informal collusion agreements made during a race, as far as I know. If there is any kind of problem here, it's that two or more colluding racers that take turns drafting each other can race faster together than each of the individual racers cycling alone, and that cycling features many different competitions including some of the same competitors. This creates a trust-dependent metagame. So the correct game theory play against someone reneging on a false promise would be for someone to seek out and draft the renegade racer in the next national championship competition, without ever giving them the opportunity to draft, thus punishing the betrayal in a tit-for-tat fashion. Seems like an inconvenient and bloody-minded thing to do, though. The business with handing over the winner's trophies to the runner-up just seemed bizarre and awkward to me.

rconti 7y ago
The 2-rider break are at a massive disadvantage compared to the riders in the peloton doing far less work and getting a much better draft, conserving far more energy. Of course, at some point, some riders may choose to try to bridge the gap, which is difficult. But typically, breakaways get swallowed up by the much more efficient peloton.
taejo 7y ago
> If there is any kind of problem here, it's that two or more colluding racers that take turns drafting each other can race faster together than each of the individual racers cycling alone, and that cycling features many different competitions including some of the same competitors. This creates a trust-dependent metagame. This "problem" is basically the whole strategic aspect of road racing.
hjk05 7y ago
> So the correct game theory play against someone reneging on a false promise would be ... To be public about the false promis removing the ability of the rider to make future deals thus removing their ability to compete on equal terms with other competitors and seriously damaging their carriers. If you want to model the real world using game theory, then you have to include the fact that players can communicate outside of active competition, and that players have reputations, tarnished by their bad faith actions.
- logfromblammo 7y ago
  Players can also lie in out-of-competition communications.

rconti 7y ago

The 2-rider break are at a massive disadvantage compared to the riders in the peloton doing far less work and getting a much better draft, conserving far more energy. Of course, at some point, some riders may choose to try to bridge the gap, which is difficult. But typically, breakaways get swallowed up by the much more efficient peloton.

taejo 7y ago

> If there is any kind of problem here, it's that two or more colluding racers that take turns drafting each other can race faster together than each of the individual racers cycling alone, and that cycling features many different competitions including some of the same competitors. This creates a trust-dependent metagame. This "problem" is basically the whole strategic aspect of road racing.

hjk05 7y ago

> So the correct game theory play against someone reneging on a false promise would be ... To be public about the false promis removing the ability of the rider to make future deals thus removing their ability to compete on equal terms with other competitors and seriously damaging their carriers. If you want to model the real world using game theory, then you have to include the fact that players can communicate outside of active competition, and that players have reputations, tarnished by their bad faith actions.

logfromblammo 7y ago
Players can also lie in out-of-competition communications.