>Everyone (not just security specialists, versed in reverse engineering) can verify if a vote has been tempered with. Tampering with paper elections is extreme

>Everyone (not just security specialists, versed in reverse engineering) can verify if a vote has been tempered with. Tampering with paper elections is extremely easy. You can throw out entire ballots, fill in choices where left blank, or force the ballot into an invalid state. Not to mention the task of counting ballots using people necessarily requires splitting up the task and trusting people. Electronic voting systems are supposed to address many of these problems, especially as processing the election becomes laborious. We don't need to give up on electronic counting solutions. We just need to make them impervious to tampering and/or verifiable. >But it is far better than trusting a computer, that by definition "can do everything computable". And falsifying an election is definitly computable. Tallying up votes by hand is also computation, you're just switching silicon for people.