4 ms·

I think you're too quick to dismiss the importance of the disagree indicator, and doing so on a shaky basis. A significant amount of time was spent trying to fi

I think you're too quick to dismiss the importance of the disagree indicator, and doing so on a shaky basis. A significant amount of time was spent trying to figure out what the hell was happening. I think it's safe to assume that if the pilots saw an error warning pop up warning that there was a disagreement between two sensors, that would focus their attention on that system—which quite conceivably could have caused them to shut it off manually sooner.

FabHK 7y ago
> that would focus their attention on that system—which quite conceivably could have caused them to shut it off manually sooner. But you can't shut off the AoA measurement "system", AFAIK. And the system causing the trouble (under wrong AoA information), the MCAS, can be shut off by setting the Stab Trim switch to Cut Out, but how should the crew know the connection between AoA and MCAS when they weren't even briefed about MCAS in the first place?
- Arn_Thor 7y ago
  iirc the Malaysian flight had in the cockpit a pilot that was hitching a ride, who figured out what was going on but too late. He knew about the MCAS. Had they vocally stated something about the AoA sensor early on, or had he caught a glimpse of the message, perhaps he could have intervened sooner. For the Ethiopian flight, you're right. They likely wouldn't have known what to do with that information. But it might have prompted them to get on the radio and ask someone, or consult a certain part of the manual (assuming there was any relevant information there.. I don't know). It certainly seems like crucial information. And even in the small chance it could have made a difference, the absence of it is critical
  - salawat 7y ago
    For Lion Air, he remedied the symptom; he realized there was some sort of periodic trim runaway, and guided them to remedy it with Stab Trim cutout without having any intrinsic understanding of what the cause or underlying principle of the runaway was. Big difference. Still didn't do anything for the fellows on the next flight.

FabHK 7y ago

> that would focus their attention on that system—which quite conceivably could have caused them to shut it off manually sooner. But you can't shut off the AoA measurement "system", AFAIK. And the system causing the trouble (under wrong AoA information), the MCAS, can be shut off by setting the Stab Trim switch to Cut Out, but how should the crew know the connection between AoA and MCAS when they weren't even briefed about MCAS in the first place?

Arn_Thor 7y ago
iirc the Malaysian flight had in the cockpit a pilot that was hitching a ride, who figured out what was going on but too late. He knew about the MCAS. Had they vocally stated something about the AoA sensor early on, or had he caught a glimpse of the message, perhaps he could have intervened sooner. For the Ethiopian flight, you're right. They likely wouldn't have known what to do with that information. But it might have prompted them to get on the radio and ask someone, or consult a certain part of the manual (assuming there was any relevant information there.. I don't know). It certainly seems like crucial information. And even in the small chance it could have made a difference, the absence of it is critical
- salawat 7y ago
  For Lion Air, he remedied the symptom; he realized there was some sort of periodic trim runaway, and guided them to remedy it with Stab Trim cutout without having any intrinsic understanding of what the cause or underlying principle of the runaway was. Big difference. Still didn't do anything for the fellows on the next flight.