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> This position is technically called eliminative materialism, that consciousness or the first person experience of reality is an illusion. I find this to be th

> This position is technically called eliminative materialism, that consciousness or the first person experience of reality is an illusion. I find this to be the most absurd idea in the history of ideas, for the simple fact that I have direct experience of consciousness (my own). Or, to quote Descartes: I think, therefore I am. What is an illusion, but a thing that can be experienced yet is not real? > Physicalism seems obvious to the current status quo, but if you become more sophisticated with the mind-body problem you will see that it does not really rest on a sold foundation. The ability to induce altered states of consciousness (such as death) through entirely physical means demonstrates that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie The logical possibility argument for philosophical zombies is essentially flawed. It posits that the conceivability of a philosophical zombie is sufficient to demonstrate meaningfulness, but plenty of conceivable things are not meaningful. Suppose I conceive instead of a person who knows a counterargument to mind-body dualism. Accepting the philosophical zombie argument requires accepting its refutation.

frankling_ 8y ago
I guess this goes into definitions of consciousness, which I don't have the background nor inclination to do. But if we define it, as the grandparent does, as "first person experience of reality", then there is something special about this particular illusion. Usually, one would reject the interpretation of an experience, not the experience itself. For instance, this could go as follows: "yes, from your vantage point, the experience was that a rabbit was pulled from an empty hat, BUT what actually occurred was that the rabbit was pulled from a hole in the table below." With consciousness, "the experience of the trick" and "the trick" are one and the same: if I have a "first person experience of reality" (which I have), then I struggle to see how it can be viewed as a trick. Due to the property of consciousness being a subjective state, it seems that eliminative materialists claim that even the EXPERIENCE of the rabbit being pulled from the empty hat is an illusion, which to me is just nonsensical (but I assume that with suitable definitions you can work around that).

frankling_ 8y ago

I guess this goes into definitions of consciousness, which I don't have the background nor inclination to do. But if we define it, as the grandparent does, as "first person experience of reality", then there is something special about this particular illusion. Usually, one would reject the interpretation of an experience, not the experience itself. For instance, this could go as follows: "yes, from your vantage point, the experience was that a rabbit was pulled from an empty hat, BUT what actually occurred was that the rabbit was pulled from a hole in the table below." With consciousness, "the experience of the trick" and "the trick" are one and the same: if I have a "first person experience of reality" (which I have), then I struggle to see how it can be viewed as a trick. Due to the property of consciousness being a subjective state, it seems that eliminative materialists claim that even the EXPERIENCE of the rabbit being pulled from the empty hat is an illusion, which to me is just nonsensical (but I assume that with suitable definitions you can work around that).