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> After discovering the lapse in 2017, Boeing performed an internal review and determined that the lack of a working warning light “did not adversely impact air
by lqet 8y ago
> After discovering the lapse in 2017, Boeing performed an internal review and determined that the lack of a working warning light “did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation,” it said in its statement.
> As a result, Boeing said it did not inform airlines or the Federal Aviation Administration about the mistake for a year.
There was a warning light installed in the cockpits which was completely non-functional in 80% of the 737 max fleet, and Boeing did not notify the airlines for an entire year? Did they honestly think that "lack of a warning light" is equal to "lack of working warning light"?
- sidcool 8y agoTime to call their BS and fine heftily to avoid such behavior in future. Imagine Boeing responsible for manned space flights.
- Kliment 8y agoBoeing is in fact in the certification pipeline for crewed spaceflight at NASA, and has received more NASA funding for this than every other applicant together, including SpaceX. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_CST-100_Starliner https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_CST-100_Starliner
- AnssiH 8y agoThe "warning light" is an "AOA DISAGREE" text that appears on the main flight display: http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/737max/updates/AOA_VaneIndicator_AoA_Disagree_lg.jpg http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/737m... So there was no non-functional physical light on the cockpit.
- lqet 8y agoAh, I was not aware of that. But surely the pilots were under the impression that such a warning message existed?
- nraynaud 8y agoSo there a weird thing about angle of attack: the autopilot uses it, but civilian pilots don’t use it (they use airspeed and descent angle). It’s used in the military, and airlines who recruit a lot of military pilots tend to buy the angle of attack option to get them comfortable. Ignoring the little MCAS issue, it was a fine reasoning, the autopilot can detect a disagree (I guess they just drop out, but I don’t know about cat 3 landings), ex-military pilots need a disagree because they read it, and other pilots don’t need to know.
- yaur 8y agoIn “the complete private pilot” they definitely talk about AoA in the context of stalls. I’m pretty surprised to hear that civilian pilots don’t use it.
- cjbprime 8y agoCivilian planes (Cessnas etc) don't even have AoA indicators, so civilian pilots couldn't use them even if they wanted to. They have started to add them just in the last few years. But of course that means they're still not in the planes most private pilots are flying.
- nraynaud 8y agoit's a very important concept, but it's a far cry from having a (redundant) gage and introducing it into the scanning pattern. Air speed is generally a very good indicator of how far you're from stall, unless you're in the army doing crazy attitudes very close to the ground. I'm pretty sure that small aerobatic planes don't have an angle of attack indicator, while the pilot would know everything there is to know about attitude control, having a number is not useful.
- nraynaud 8y agoI would add an analogy: wing loading is an extremely important concept, and there is absolutely zero plane with a direct force reading on the wing spars.
- kirykl 8y agoSo is that text warning always available and just software enabled if the packaged is purchased, or is there extra hardware involved?
- ineedasername 8y agoThat's kind of a distinction without a difference. A standard function was non-functional.
- Chris_Chambers 8y agoWhy are there only two sensors? Are these large and ridiculously expensive devices? Why aren’t there a hundred sensors?
- jrochkind1 8y agoI think that makes it worse on Boeing's part, that it was a software-only feature that was disabled from those who didn't pay. They didn't even have to "install" any hardware. It sounds like the software accidentally coupled functionality of this light to another feature. It is in fact a software bug. To fix the bug would have required a software redeploy -- which is definitely non-trivial thing in safety-critical software, and may have required some kind of recertification, or at any rate significant expense. Instead, they could have done what they in fact _have done_ only _after_ people died: > In the months after the Lion Air crash, Boeing quietly worked to appease some customers, according to a person briefed on the matter. In several instances, it activated the angle of attack indicator for free, which then turned on the disagree alert. Well, quietly, for some customers, who know to insist on it and have the purchasing power to get what they insist on. All Boeing had to do was flip a switch to turn the software feature on, without charging for it.