5 ms·

I hate that attitude from entitled users so much. If you don't want security, you're welcome to have a malware-ridden system, but don't think that this means al

I hate that attitude from entitled users so much. If you don't want security, you're welcome to have a malware-ridden system, but don't think that this means all users should have to put up with malware-ridden systems.

zaat 7y ago
I wish that was true, but in fact I have no way to disable this and similiar amazing security entrenchments. The monthly device bricking windows updates, for instance. If I can't do anything with my hardened computer, I don't care if is eaten alive by malware, it is useless anyways. At work, as the guy who have to fight on behalf of the sysadmins and the users dozens of clueless security advisors who are hardening everything according to security best-practices written by similarily clueless experts, I'm seriously astonished by the common backward thinking. If you are blocking access to all users pdf files, for an instance, you are the malware, you are causing disturbance to the business operation and annoying everyone.
- rosser 7y ago
  This petulant antagonism ("You are the malware!", "No YOU ARE!") between users and security is contrary to everyone's interests. Go sit in separate corners, both of you. Think really, really hard about how both of your jobs are critical to the long-term success of the business. Don't come back until you've meaningfully internalized that.
  - zaat 7y ago
    I'm having hard time understanding what are you referring to. All I'm saying is that I had a perfectly working system and now it is no more functioning properly. Why would anyone see this as more secure is beyond me. Similarily, when "security best-practices" are leading to hundreds of my users losing SSO access to their BI system, or hundreds of printers rendered unusable because of security update that requires administrative permissions for reinstalling the same drivers that were perfectly working so far, I don't care for your security benefits. They suppose to defend against the thing that you are causing. You are already damaging the organization with thousands of working hours lost, and everyone is frustrated, as a bonus.
LifeLiverTransp 7y ago
Sorry, but where is the difference from a secure-system that allows central control - and a male-ware backdoored system? All that is diffrent is the promise of non-maliciousness. Which often does not hold up. Cause money is corrosive to those little centralized empires of "all-can-fail-but-me". Security is diversity, as in having a non-centrally controllable ecosystem, that is not a mono-culture. Your updates are the danger, your urge for control is the forrest fire. Linux is not secure because its updated often. As package maintainer take-overs have show- that is even a vector. Its secure, because its fragmented into a thousand small populations, which offer no real financially interesting attack vector for a large scale take over.
- Wowfunhappy 7y ago
  Linux's diversity also makes it difficult to package and distribute non-malicious software, so I'm not sure that's the poster child for how to do security without compromising usability. (The situation is admittedly getting better with Flatpak.)
Wowfunhappy 7y ago
> If you don't want security, you're welcome to have a malware-ridden system No, I am apparently not. Microsoft, Apple, and others insist on making it difficult. At least I found out today that I can install unsigned Firefox extensions once I switch to a special "unbranded" build. I'm glad Mozilla, at least, still offers that. Here's the thing: I disable a lot of the security stuff you're not supposed to disable, when I can. I use a Jailbroken iPhone. My Mac has SIP and Gatekeeper turned off. Windows Defender is turned off on my gaming PC, and I lower Microsoft's driver signing requirements to the greatest extent allowed. I also ran an unpatched day-1 build of Windows 10 for around four years, with the autoupdate system forcibly neutered. (I now run LTSB, instead.) I have never been bitten by a virus, ever†. I don't know if that's because of all the security measures I'm not able to turn off or because I've been lucky or something else. I suspect it's because I don't run dodgy software. Or maybe my life is a lie and all my devices have been infected for the past decade, and I never noticed. In the meantime, I'm not seeing the upside to software forcing hardened security. --- P.S. While I share their frustrations, I don't endorse the GP's attitude. I know that a lot of people really are doing difficult work with the best of intentions. † Except for a handful of times when I was testing suspicious software in a disposable VM. That doesn't count for obvious reasons.
- iczero 7y ago
  Just because you haven't been affected by a virus doesn't mean you never will. For example, the patch for the zero-day exploited by WannaCry was sent over windows update a few months before WannaCry existed. I personally use Linux, so Windows Update doesn't exactly exist for me, but I still update my system whenever such updates are available. Both SIP and driver signing are both mechanisms to prevent the installation of rootkits. If you do get a virus, such mechanisms would prevent it from hiding itself or causing more damage to the system. Not running dodgy software is indeed a very effective way to not get viruses, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take more security precautions if they are available. What if, for example, malware exploits a zero-day in your browser and successfully installs itself without any interaction from the user? Windows Defender and related antivirus could detect malicious activity from such malware and remove it on windows and Gatekeeper/SIP/driver signing and related systems could severely limit its impact. Mozilla probably introduced extension signing to prevent less technically inclined users from having adware installed into their browser. X.509 introduces certificate expiration, and X.509 is the most widely used mechanism for signing things. The only reason you have this problem is because the folks at Mozilla forgot to renew that intermediate certificate. While I agree that it should be possible for users to disable extension signing, as users should be able to do whatever they want on their own system, you shouldn't blame them for forgetting to renew a certificate associated with an additional security measure built to protect users from malware.
mort96 7y ago
Say what now? Users are entitled for being in control of their own systems? Are you crazy?
- CamperBob2 7y ago
  It's just the IBM mainframe priesthood reasserting its dominance, lurching from the tomb of computing history to save us all from ourselves. Nothing to see here.

zaat 7y ago

I wish that was true, but in fact I have no way to disable this and similiar amazing security entrenchments. The monthly device bricking windows updates, for instance. If I can't do anything with my hardened computer, I don't care if is eaten alive by malware, it is useless anyways. At work, as the guy who have to fight on behalf of the sysadmins and the users dozens of clueless security advisors who are hardening everything according to security best-practices written by similarily clueless experts, I'm seriously astonished by the common backward thinking. If you are blocking access to all users pdf files, for an instance, you are the malware, you are causing disturbance to the business operation and annoying everyone.

rosser 7y ago
This petulant antagonism ("You are the malware!", "No YOU ARE!") between users and security is contrary to everyone's interests. Go sit in separate corners, both of you. Think really, really hard about how both of your jobs are critical to the long-term success of the business. Don't come back until you've meaningfully internalized that.
- zaat 7y ago
  I'm having hard time understanding what are you referring to. All I'm saying is that I had a perfectly working system and now it is no more functioning properly. Why would anyone see this as more secure is beyond me. Similarily, when "security best-practices" are leading to hundreds of my users losing SSO access to their BI system, or hundreds of printers rendered unusable because of security update that requires administrative permissions for reinstalling the same drivers that were perfectly working so far, I don't care for your security benefits. They suppose to defend against the thing that you are causing. You are already damaging the organization with thousands of working hours lost, and everyone is frustrated, as a bonus.

LifeLiverTransp 7y ago

Sorry, but where is the difference from a secure-system that allows central control - and a male-ware backdoored system? All that is diffrent is the promise of non-maliciousness. Which often does not hold up. Cause money is corrosive to those little centralized empires of "all-can-fail-but-me". Security is diversity, as in having a non-centrally controllable ecosystem, that is not a mono-culture. Your updates are the danger, your urge for control is the forrest fire. Linux is not secure because its updated often. As package maintainer take-overs have show- that is even a vector. Its secure, because its fragmented into a thousand small populations, which offer no real financially interesting attack vector for a large scale take over.

Wowfunhappy 7y ago
Linux's diversity also makes it difficult to package and distribute non-malicious software, so I'm not sure that's the poster child for how to do security without compromising usability. (The situation is admittedly getting better with Flatpak.)

Wowfunhappy 7y ago

> If you don't want security, you're welcome to have a malware-ridden system No, I am apparently not. Microsoft, Apple, and others insist on making it difficult. At least I found out today that I can install unsigned Firefox extensions once I switch to a special "unbranded" build. I'm glad Mozilla, at least, still offers that. Here's the thing: I disable a lot of the security stuff you're not supposed to disable, when I can. I use a Jailbroken iPhone. My Mac has SIP and Gatekeeper turned off. Windows Defender is turned off on my gaming PC, and I lower Microsoft's driver signing requirements to the greatest extent allowed. I also ran an unpatched day-1 build of Windows 10 for around four years, with the autoupdate system forcibly neutered. (I now run LTSB, instead.) I have never been bitten by a virus, ever†. I don't know if that's because of all the security measures I'm not able to turn off or because I've been lucky or something else. I suspect it's because I don't run dodgy software. Or maybe my life is a lie and all my devices have been infected for the past decade, and I never noticed. In the meantime, I'm not seeing the upside to software forcing hardened security. --- P.S. While I share their frustrations, I don't endorse the GP's attitude. I know that a lot of people really are doing difficult work with the best of intentions. † Except for a handful of times when I was testing suspicious software in a disposable VM. That doesn't count for obvious reasons.

iczero 7y ago
Just because you haven't been affected by a virus doesn't mean you never will. For example, the patch for the zero-day exploited by WannaCry was sent over windows update a few months before WannaCry existed. I personally use Linux, so Windows Update doesn't exactly exist for me, but I still update my system whenever such updates are available. Both SIP and driver signing are both mechanisms to prevent the installation of rootkits. If you do get a virus, such mechanisms would prevent it from hiding itself or causing more damage to the system. Not running dodgy software is indeed a very effective way to not get viruses, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take more security precautions if they are available. What if, for example, malware exploits a zero-day in your browser and successfully installs itself without any interaction from the user? Windows Defender and related antivirus could detect malicious activity from such malware and remove it on windows and Gatekeeper/SIP/driver signing and related systems could severely limit its impact. Mozilla probably introduced extension signing to prevent less technically inclined users from having adware installed into their browser. X.509 introduces certificate expiration, and X.509 is the most widely used mechanism for signing things. The only reason you have this problem is because the folks at Mozilla forgot to renew that intermediate certificate. While I agree that it should be possible for users to disable extension signing, as users should be able to do whatever they want on their own system, you shouldn't blame them for forgetting to renew a certificate associated with an additional security measure built to protect users from malware.

mort96 7y ago

Say what now? Users are entitled for being in control of their own systems? Are you crazy?

CamperBob2 7y ago
It's just the IBM mainframe priesthood reasserting its dominance, lurching from the tomb of computing history to save us all from ourselves. Nothing to see here.