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I don't think that's necessarily true. After all, the policy is effective against undesirable-but-not-malicious extensions. Before signature verification I ha

I don't think that's necessarily true. After all, the policy is effective against undesirable-but-not-malicious extensions. Before signature verification I had extensions installed in Firefox that I didn't install; today I don't. [1] And the clearly malicious action of modifying Firefox to disable signature verification can and should be flagged by anti-malware software, which runs at a higher privilege level. [1] Putting aside for the moment the fact that most users now have no extensions installed due to the certificate expiration issue. No Firefox user, myself included, is happy about that.

the8472 7y ago
I consider these to be mental acrobatics to find a position to justify wresting away any control from the user. It is not mozilla's responsibility to attempt to protect the user from the very slim line of "effectively malicious but still somehow principled" malware, picking a near-by line of verifying once would be far less problematic. If the user does not want that crap on their machine they should remove the origin instead. We would not have the current situation if mozilla did not assume responsibility and control for problems outside their domain. At least they could have made this opt-in by asking the user if they want an extra locked down version of firefox that might disable their addons if they are deemed malicious. Then the user could have made an informed choice.
heavenlyhash 7y ago
> Before signature verification I had extensions installed in Firefox that I didn't install ... How? I agree with the sibling poster; it sounds like you already lost.