5 ms·
Not the commenter, but I think the point is that there are simply too many ways to bypass protections. If you want someone to be able to view data, it is imposs
by cortesoft 8y ago
Not the commenter, but I think the point is that there are simply too many ways to bypass protections. If you want someone to be able to view data, it is impossible to prevent them from exfiltrating it. In many ways it is similar to the analog hole problem with DRM.
You can make it harder to do on accident, or to prevent someone from doing it for convenience (e.g. someone copying data to an insecure location to have easier access to do their job), but you can't stop a malicious actor from getting the data.
They could tunnel over DNS, they could use a camera phone and record the data on the screen, etc. The possibilities are endless.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog_hole https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog_hole
- dragonwriter 8y ago> You can make it harder to do on accident That's a major point of exfiltration prevention, both because accidents are a real problem and because reducing the opportunity for accidents makes it easier to establish that intentional exfiltration is intentional, which makes the ability to impose serious consequences for it greater (especially against privilege insiders with key contractual benefits that can only be taken away for cause.) Technical safeguards aren't standalone, they integrate with social safeguards.
- lixtra 8y ago>> You can make it harder to do on accident >That's a major point of exfiltration prevention But that’s not how it is advertised. Usually they claim is to catch hackers and mal intending employees.
- TeMPOraL 8y agoAdvertising is 100% bullshit, both in this space and elsewhere. I'm not sure why even well-paid people in positions of corporate power don't seem to get it. It's similar to Gell-Mann amnesia.
- azernik 8y agoIt's hard to prevent data exfiltration by an attacker with physical access to your premises, but it's much easier to prevent exfiltration (especially of large quantities of data) by compromised devices.
- XorNot 8y agoI read a great paper talking about this problem once, which made the point that the only actual measure of data security is the bandwidth of possible side-channels vs useful size of the data.
- muxator 8y agoDo you happen to have any pointers about this? I would be very interested.
- gspetr 8y agoThe parent was probably talking about this paper: https://csyhua.github.io/csyhua/hua-ipdps2018.pdf https://csyhua.github.io/csyhua/hua-ipdps2018.pdf Here are a few more (somewhat) related to this topic: 1.Joe Grand, “Advanced Hardware Hacking Techniques”, Defcon 12 http://www.grandideastudio.com/files/security/hardware/advanced_hardware_hacking_techniques_slides.pdf http://www.grandideastudio.com/files/security/hardware/advan... 2.Josh Jaffe, “Differential Power Analysis”, Summer School on Cryptographic Hardware http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/ecrypt-scard/jaffe.pdfhttp://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/ecrypt-scard/jaffe2.pdf http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/ecrypt-scard/jaffe.pdfhttp:... 3.S. Mangard, E. Oswald, T. Popp, “Power Analysis Attacks -Revealing the Secrets of Smartcards” http://www.dpabook.org/ http://www.dpabook.org/ 4.Dan J. Bernstein, ''Cache-timing attacks on AES'', http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#cachetiming http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#cachetiming, 2005. 5.D. Brumley, D. Boneh, “Remote Timing Attacks are Practical” http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf 6.P. Kocher, "Design and Validation Strategies for Obtaining Assurance in Countermeasures to Power Analysis and Related Attacks", NIST Physical Security Testing Workshop -Honolulu, Sept. 26, 2005 http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/physec/papers/physecpaper09.pdf http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/physec/papers/physecpaper09.pd... 7.E. Oswald, K. Schramm, “An Efficient Masking Scheme for AES Software Implementations” www.iaik.tugraz.at/research/sca-lab/publications/pdf/Oswald2006AnEfficientMasking.pdf 8.Cryptography Research, Inc. Patents and Licensing http://www.cryptography.com/technology/dpa/licensing.html http://www.cryptography.com/technology/dpa/licensing.html
- 8y ago
- yoz 8y ago> You can make it harder to do on accident, or to prevent someone from doing it for convenience Why are you discounting these as valuable use cases? In my experience, they're far more common than the determinedly-malicious actor. And they're far, FAR more common than the malicious actor who also (a) knows that the exfil monitor is there, and (b) has the technical prowess to circumvent it. (The analog hole is only _trivially_ usable for certain kinds of data.) (I am continually frustrated by the number of people who claim that protection is worthless if it's potentially circumventable. In most situations, covering 90% of attacks is still worthwhile.)
- ethbro 8y ago> I am continually frustrated by the number of people who claim that protection is worthless if it's potentially circumventable. In most situations, covering 90% of attacks is still worthwhile People are saying that because it's misguided and potentially harmful. Doing so is security theater, where the solution is scoped down to something incomplete but easier, and then everyone walks away happy they solved 90% of the smaller problem they chose to attempt. Particularly with things like data exfiltration, this is potentially harmful because then you've organizationally blinded yourself. Nobody wants to poke holes in their own solution, and so they stop looking. But, hey, we're catching the odd employee accidentally sharing confidential documents via OneDrive. Fast forward a year, and an entire DB gets transferred out via an unknown vector, nobody finds out about it for a couple months, and it's all "Oh! How did this happen? We had monitoring in place." Go big, or run the risk of putting blinders on yourself.
- fencepost 8y agoThe way I'm reading this, your attitude seems to be "if you can't stop targeted nation state actions you might as well not bother with network security and just run unencrypted wifi everywhere." Network security is a balancing act between prevention, detection, needed user and network capabilities and cost. If I have unlimited money or no limitations on hindering network usage I can make a 100% secure network - it's not even that expensive, just unplug it all.
- hueving 8y ago
- smallnamespace 8y ago> there are simply too many ways to bypass protections This is not a good general principle, since it can be easily applied in contexts that (I would predict) many same individuals would vehemently disagree with. For example: - Personal privacy is pointless, there are simply too many ways for governments/corporations/fellow citizens to find things out about you - Strong taxation enforcement by governments is pointless, there are simply too many avenues for legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion - Nuclear arms control is pointless, the knowledge of how to make a bomb and enrich uranium is widely available (I mean, if NK could pull it off, how hard could it be?) Maybe data exfiltration prevention isn't a good policy, but I think you need a more nuanced argument than 'there are ways around it'.
- nine_k 8y agoAll these things work statistically, preventing a certain part of incidents. They are not a guarantee that an incident cannot happen, though. They can only lower the rate at which incidents (privacy violations, tax evasion, nuclear proliferation) occur. Same with exfiltration.