Actually, I can see how this process actually solves the problem of extreme preferences, and does it in favor of those minorities who have the most to gain. Su

Actually, I can see how this process actually solves the problem of extreme preferences, and does it in favor of those minorities who have the most to gain. Suppose I belong to minority group X (say people with a rare disease, LGBT, immigrants...) whose life will literally change by approving or rejecting a bill. On the other side, a similarly sized group Y strongly opposes the first group out of first principles from their ideology (reducing taxes, sanctity of heterosexual marriage, keeping the country "pure"). Usually this group will have strong opinions against several of those social issues, but none of them will really affect their lives directly. So, their votes will be divided among several issues. Therefore, the votes of a small group will decide the outcome in their benefit on those issues that strongly affect them, unless: 1) an equal opposing group has the same extreme incentives (and in that case, the opinion of the overall population will decide), or 2) the opposing group is much larger than the small group. I'd say that, in both cases, it is reasonable to think that the system is working as it should.